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ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: THE OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL COUNSEL AND WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTION
THOMAS
DONALD

M. DEVINE*
G. APLIN**

The term 'whistleblower' is like 'motherhood,' and we are all for
whistleblowing apparently.
1978 remarks of Representative Derwinski during House Markup
of Civil Service Reform Act provisions establishing protection for
federal whistleblowers. I
"[Q] In your statement you say that most managers follow the
law .. .[a]nd have integrity.

"[A] That is my firm belief.
"[Q] And that most whistleblowers are malcontents.
"[A] That has been my experience."
1985 exchange between Representative Schroeder and Special
Counsel K. William O'Connor, the official responsible
under the
2
Reform Act for protection of whistleblowers.
Even the clearest congressional intent is no stronger than the commitment of those with the discretion and responsibility to implement a
statute. For federal employee "whistleblowers," 3-those who challenge
* Legal Director, Government Accountability Project (GAP); Adjunct Professor of Law,
Antioch School of Law. J.D., 1980, Antioch School of Law; B.A., 1974, Georgetown University.
** Staff Associate, GAP. Member of the class of 1987, Antioch School of Law; B.A., 1983,
Pomona College.
The authors wish to thank Janet Bossart and the Antioch Law Journal staff for their patience
and invaluable editing assistance. In addition, we thank Red Provost and Joe Sella of GAP for their
assistance in the preparation of this Article.
I Markup Meetings on H.R. 11280 of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978) [hereinafter cited as House Markup].
2 Hearingson Whistleblower ProtectionBefore the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service
Subcomm. on Civil Service, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 259 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 1985 Hearings].
3 In the federal civil service system, whistleblowers are those employees or applicants for employment who are protected against retaliation by the prohibited personnel practice codified in 5
U.S.C. 2302(b)(8). See infra nn.53-61. In relevant regulations the statutory provision is illustrated
by the definition of "whistleblower" as "a present or former Federal employee or applicant for Federal employment who discloses information he reasonably believes evidences a violation of any law,
rule, or regulation, or mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
or specific danger to public health or safety, if the disclosure is not specifically prohibited by statute
and if such information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest
of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs .... Disclosure of information to the Special
Counsel, agency Inspector General, or other employee designated by the agency head to receive such
information is protected even if the disclosure would otherwise be prohibited by statute or is otherwise required by Executive order to be kept secret." 5 C.F.R. 1250.3(c) (1986).
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governmental fraud, waste and abuse-the experience of the Civil Service
Reform Act 4 ("CSRA" or "Reform Act") has demonstrated an even

more painful truth: rights are not meaningful unless victims can enforce
their violations in the courts. Remedies whose enforcement are at the
mercy of a bureaucratic champion's whims inherently provide "soft"
rights that are vulnerable to administrative abuse of authority. In the
case of the Reform Act, the Office of the Special Counsel5 ("Office" or
"OSC"), responsible for protecting the civil service rights of federal employees, has disintegrated into an effective weapon against the intended
beneficiaries.
One of the primary trends of the last decade has been the surge of
legal protection for government and corporate employees to dissent
against on-the-job misconduct when the implications are significant for
public policy. Establishing the rights of "whistleblowers" has become a
genuine phenomenon, 6 introduced through three primary models. For
corporate employees, the majority rule now permits suits for punitive
damages as a "public policy exception" to the "at-will" doctrine that
historically granted the master complete discretion to dismiss the servant. 7 This model allows employees to sue in tort for punitive damages
under the state court system after being dismissed for defending public
health and safety.
The second recent model provides remedies under seven particular
federal environmental statutes to any employees-government or corporate-who are discriminated against for attempting to help carry out the
respective statutes' provisions. 8 Under this approach, the employee can
challenge an adverse personnel action through a full evidentiary hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge who issues a recommended deci4 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. I 11 (1978) (codified in scat-

tered sections of 5 U.S.C.)

5 See infra p. 18 & nn.74-94.
6 See, e.g., The New York Times, December 4, 1985, at A28, col. 3. As one commentator
explained in 1982, "Less than a decade ago, whistleblowing was a scorned activity, often officially
punished; today, Congress approves whistleblowing in the strongest terms and protects
whistleblowers in several innovative and important ways." [hereinafter cited as Farnsworth];
Vaughn, Statutory Protection of Whistleblowers in the Federal Executive Branch, U. OF ILL. L.R.
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Vaughn]. For a general review, see Kohn, An Overview of Federaland
State Whistleblower Protections, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 99 (1986).
7 Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUMBIA L.R. 1404 (1967). See also Strasser, Employment at-Will: The
Death of a Doctrine?, I THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 6-7 (Jan. 20, 1986) [hereinafter cited as
Strasser].
8 See, Carpenter & Kohn, Nuclear Whistleblower Protection and the Scope of ProtectedActivity
under Section 210 of the Energy ReorganizationAct, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 73 (1986) [hereinafter cited as
Carpenter]. For a thorough review of procedure, precedent and strategy under this model, see
KOHN, PROTECTING ENVIRONMENTAL AND NUCLEAR WHISTLEBLOWERS: A LITIGATION MANUAL (1985) [hereinafter cited as KOHN]; See also BENDER, UNJUST DISMISSAL (1985).
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sion. The Secretary of Labor issues a final agency decision which is subject to judicial review. 9
The most publicized, initially most acclaimed model, however, was
part of the new system of federal employee rights called prohibited personnel practices established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.10
Congress largely entrusted enforcement of these new statutory rights to
the prosecutorial discretion of an Office of the Special Counsel and to the
decisions issued by a new administrative tribunal, the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB" or "Board")."I
Of the three models, the "public policy exception" generally has
been recognized as the most significant advance in the right to dissent
responsibly. 12 While the record is mixed, commentators view the environmental whistleblower remedies through the Department of Labor as a
distinct, if modest advance.' 3 By contrast, federal whistleblowers and
commentators have attacked the Civil Service Reform Act as a significant retreat in practice for free speech rights-legislative assistance that
dissenting federal employees would be better off without. 14 By 1982, the
Office of the Special Counsel already was such a trojan horse that Representative Patricia Schroeder (D.-Col.), a primary congressional champion of creating the agency, introduced a bill to abolish it.15
Legislative policy for whistleblower protection is still in its infancy.
Not all employees are yet covered by any free speech remedy, 16 and the
9 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 5851.

10 Supra note 4; 5 U.S.C. 2302. See also Maroldo, ProhibitedPersonnelPractices: Allegations of
Reprisalfor Whistleblowing, 82 FEDERAL MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION REPORTER, V-5 (March
1982); and Eastwood, ProhibitedPersonnel Practices and Whistleblowing, FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE
LAW AND PROCEDURES: A BASIC GUIDE (1984) [hereinafter cited as Eastwood]. For an exhaustive
review of this prohibited personnel practice, see generally, Vaughn, supra note 6.
11 5 U.S.C. 1201-03, 1205-08. The Board hears appeals under 5 U.S.C. 7701.
12 See Strasser, supra note 7.
13 See generally Kohn, supra note 8.
14See generally 1985 Hearings, supra note 2 (testimony of witnesses not representing the
Administration).
15 H.R. 6392, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). As Representative Schroeder explained at the time,
"[The bill's] introduction should send a loud and clear message to the Special Counsel that it is time
for the Office to start justifying its existence." Statement of Rep. Patricia Schroeder at press conference on whistleblower protection (May 17, 1982).
16For example, 24 states have not adopted the public policy exception. Strasser supra note 7.
Similarly, jurisdiction for prohibited personnel practices is limited under 5 U.S.C. 2302(a) only to
specified "personnel actions" for civil service employees in "covered positions" at specified "agencies." To illustrate, whistleblowers who are deprived of vacation benefits or support staff have no
jurisdiction to challenge the alleged harassment as a prohibited personnel practice. Employees of
government corporations, the Library of Congress, federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies
and the General Accounting Office are excluded from coverage against prohibited personnel practices. Some personnel actions, such as transfers or loss or duties that could result in loss of grade, do
not create jurisdiction for direct appeals to the Merit Systems Protection Board but can be challenged through the Office of the Special Counsel. Foreign service employees have similar limited
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challenge is so great that even the best models will require extensive adjustments before the right to dissent in practice stops routinely being the
catalyst for employee Profiles in Courage.17 A survey of the gap between
legislative intent and reality under the Civil Service Reform Act-both
with respect to the Special Counsel's performance and the new statutory
rights' impact on traditional remedies-may be instructive to persistent
legislators who attempt to learn from the early lessons of this model.' 8
I. BACKGROUND

The whistleblower protections established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 challenged two well-entrenched traditions: 1) a federal
civil service system whose structure had largely remained intact since it
was established in 1883 after a disappointed patronage seeker assassinated President Garfield; 19 and 2) a pattern of "reprisal against those
who disclose misconduct by others [that] is as old as the history of organized social groups."' 20 The organizational instinct is so well-engrained
that the effort to implement freedom of speech for civil servants may be
as difficult as the challenge to transform integration from a formal right
21
to a reality after Brown v. Board of Education.
Until recently public employees did not enjoy any privileged legal
status. The traditional view that a government employer could terminate
an employee for any reason or no reason was based on the premise that
public employment is a privilege, rather than a right. This viewpoint is
illustrated by Justice Holmes' statement nearly a century ago that a public servant "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.

'22

relief to challenge prohibited personnel practices through the Special Counsel, but no access to a
MSPB hearing. For a complete discussion of jurisdictional limitations, see Vaughn, supra note 6.
17 See infra note 20. See also Feliu, The Role of the Law in ProtectingScientific and Technical
Dissent, IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE 3 (June 1985).
18 On January 22, 1986 a bipartisan group of legislators introduced the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1986, S. 2014 and H.R. 4033, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). Among other provisions, the
proposal would lower the burden of proof for whistleblowers from a "preponderance of the evidence" to "substantial evidence"; provide jurisdiction for employees to seek a stay or appeal any
alleged prohibited personnel practices for a Board hearing, instead of restricting remedies for certain
causes of action to those obtained by the OSC, and establishes that the Special Counsel must protect
the rights of complainants as in an attorney-client relationship. Although on September 22 the
House adopted H.R. 4033, the Senate adjourned without acting on the legislation.
19 Gebhardt et al., BLUEPRINT FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 9 (Fund for Constitutional Government, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Gebhardt].
20 Farnsworth, supra note 6. While the Nixon procedures organized the techniques into a
blueprint for executive tyranny, as one authority noted, the practices "are as old as the bureaucracy
itself." Vaughn, Whistleblowing and the Characterof Public Employment, 6 THE BUREAUCRAT 29,
31 (Winter 1977) [hereinafter cited as BUREAUCRAT].
21 Brown v. Board of Education, 344 U.S. 1 (1952).
22 McCauliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
Until Pickering in 1968,
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The legal tradition also was grounded in routine practice. Historically, government agencies have reacted to employee disclosures of improper or illegal activities by punishing the employee who blew the
whistle. Although the techniques vary, agencies employ a wide variety of
options to retaliate against bureaucratic dissenters. Frequent choices
have ranged from outright termination on trumped-up charges of incompetence or wrongdoing; transfer to a bureaucratic Siberia; forced psychi23
atric examinations; to the removal of all meaningful duties.
As one commentator explained,
E Pluribus Unum may be emblazoned on our nation's official seals
and currency, but, in the government, the Motto Don't Make
Waves is what is enshrined in the hearts and minds of every rightthinking civil servant. This means: Don't be an oddball; don't be
a radical; don't be a whistleblower. If you fit into any of these
categories, your position will range narrowly, from uncomfortable
to untenable.... Being a Democrat or a Republican is just a party
24
affiliation. Don't Make Waves is a religion.
By 1978 the time was ripe for legislative free speech initiatives. In
1959 the California courts established the first application of the public
policy exception to the "at will" doctrine for private employees. 2 5 In
1968 in Pickering v. Board of Education,26 the Supreme Court established
that the first amendment protects government employees who dissent in
27
public forums.
During the 1970s Congress and professional societies increasingly
support of First Amendment protection for public employees was limited to "dissenting opinions,
obiter dicta, law review articles, and other indications of an evolution in judicial thinking about the
scope of the First Amendment." Ewing, Winning Freedom on the Job: From Assembly Line to
Executive Suite, 4 Civ. LIB. REV. 13 (1977). The basis for the traditional threat to public dissenters
was summarized more recently in a 1970 speech by then Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel: "I think one may fairly generalize that a government employee, and certainly a government attorney, is seriously restricted in his freedom of speech with
respect to any matter for which he has assigned responsibility .... One simply cannot work a part
of the time in serving the Air Force or any other organization and then expend other efforts in
tearing it down." (Italics omitted). Speech by Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist to the
Federal Bar Association (Sept. 18, 1970).
23 See infra note 31.
24 Isbell, Dissidents in the Federal Government, 4 Civ. LIB. REV. 72 (1977).
25 Peterman v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 184, 344 P.2d
25 (1959).
26 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
27 The dissent was in the form of a letter to the editor of the newspaper. 391 U.S. at 575-78.
Pickeringwas foreshadowed by Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). In that decision
the Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement of teachers who had been dismissed for refusing to
sign a certificate that they had never been members of the Communist Party. The Court declared
that "liberties [cannot] be infringed by the denial of or placing a condition upon a benefit or privilege." Id. at 606.
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recognized the importance of open discussion and dissent for scientific
and technological decisionmaking to protect public health and safety. A
1974 alliance between dissenting scientists at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and congressional consumer advocates helped to expose
and partially curtail FDA approval of hazardous drugs, in part through
creation of a Special Counsel to investigate the controversy. 28 Throughout the 1970s scientific and technical professional societies accelerated a
trend to adopt professional codes of ethics that specified members' primary duties to the public. By 1980 a survey conducted by the American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) found that 82 out
of 150 professional societies that responded had adopted some form of
ethical rules.

29

There were five primary catalysts for passage of the whistleblower
provisions in the Reform Act. In large part the legislation was a response to systematic civil service abuses exposed during the Watergate
Hearings, as well as to the resulting low morale within the federal
workforce. 30 The Nixon Administration had attempted to transform retaliation against politically "unresponsive" employees into a fine art
through the Malek-May Manual, a secret report distributed to top managers throughout the Executive branch. The Manual was a blueprint for
circumventing the civil service laws by harassing disfavored employees of
3t
the civil service system.
28 Speech by C. Kennedy, "Whistleblowing:

Contribution or Catastrophe?" to the American

Association for the Advancement of Science (Feb. 15, 1978).
29 Chalk, et al., PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ACTIVITIES IN THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING SO-

CIETIES, 19 (1980). To illustrate the rules the American Society of Civil Engineers Code of Ethics
includes the following "Fundamental Canons:"
1. Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in the
performance of their professional duties.
2. Engineers shall perform services only in areas of their competence.
3. Engineers shall issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner.
4. Engineers shall act in professional matters for each employer or client as faithful
agents or trustees, and shall avoid conflicts of interest.
5. Engineers shall build their professional reputation on the merit of their service and
shall not compete unfairly with others.
6. Engineers shall act in such a manner as to uphold and enhance the honor, integrity,
and dignity of the engineering profession.
7. Engineers shall continue their professional development throughout their careers,
and shall provide opportunities for the professional development of those engineers
under their supervision.
Id. at 187.
30 Executive Session Hearings Before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities of
the United States Senate on Presidential Campaign Activities in 1972, Book 18, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(April 8, 1974).
31 See generally Hearings on Civil Service Reform Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. See also Ewing, Canning
Directions: How the Government Rids Itselfof Troublemakers, HARPERS 16 (August 1979). See also
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A second factor prompting passage of the whistleblower provisions
was Congress' dissatisfaction with the emerging judicial trend to restrict
the first amendment coverage sketched out in Pickering ten years earlier.
This was one of the themes in the Leahy Report, a massive study under
the leadership of Senator Patrick Leahy (D.-Vt.) that provided the policy
and factual foundation for the congressional initiative to strengthen
whistleblower protection. 32 Academic works on the weaknesses of first
amendment protection were included in the hearing record. 33 After reviewing the unreliability of constitutional protections for whistleblowers,
during floor debate Senator Sasser concluded that contrary to the status
quo, "it should be public policy to encourage responsible whistleblowing
'3 4
rather than chill it."

The problem centered on the interpretation of relative interests in
the balancing test established by Pickering to determine whether dissent
merits constitutional relief. The test weighs the government employee's
right as a citizen to comment on matters of public concern against the
state's interest in efficient government operations. 35 In a footnote the
Gebhardt, supra note 19. For example, Pentagon cost expert Ernest Fitzgerald exposed the $2 billion Lockheed C5A cost overrun to a congressional committee. That began nearly two decades of
retaliation, legal counterattacks, and continued whistleblowing by one of history's most persistent
public dissenters. His next assignment was to audit bowling alleys in Thailand. In Fitzgerald's case,
the Watergate tapes reveal that the order to "get that son-of-a-bitch" came directly from President
Nixon. Quoted in pet. cert. at App. C, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). The President's
hostility to Mr. Fitzgerald was ironic in light of remarks by then Senator Nixon in 1951 when he
introduced a bill to strengthen the prohibitions against reprisal for congressional testimony:
It is essential to the security of the Nation and the very lives of the people, as we look
into these vitally important issues, that every witness have complete freedom from reprisal when he is given an opportunity to tell what he knows.
There is too much at stake to permit foreign policy and military strategy to be
established on the basis of half truths and the suppression of testimony.
Unless protection is given to witnesses who are members of the armed services or
employees of the Government, the scheduled hearings will amount to no more than a
parade of yes men for administration policies as they exist.
97 CONG. REC. 4393-94 (1951) (statement of Senator Nixon).
32 The Whistleblowers: A Report on FederalEmployees who Disclose Acts of Government Waste,
Abuse and CorruptionPreparedfor the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
42-44 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Leahy Report].
33 See, e.g., Coven, The First Amendment Rights of Policymaking Public Employees, 12 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 559 (1977). The Leahy Report included a chapter on the first amendment protections of federal employee, noting their weaknesses. Leahy Report, supra note 32. See also Vaughn,
supra note 6 at 637.
34 See 124 CONG. REC. 27548 S14280 (daily ed. August 24, 1978) (statement of Sen. Sasser).
-5 391 U.S. 568, 571. The Supreme Court emphasized that it is "essential" that public officials
who are most informed about issues of public importance "be able to speak out freely on such
questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal." Id. at 572. The Court characterized this capacity
for dissent as the "core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment." Id. at 571.
However, the Court attempted to balance "the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
on matters of public concern" with "the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public service it performs through its employees." Id. at 568. While refusing to
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Court listed several factors which should be considered when attempting
to balance the competing concerns. On a case-by-case basis, criteria that
could outweigh the public's interest in disclosure included: a demonstrated need for confidentiality; "certain forms of public criticism" that
"seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working relationship between a superior and a subordinate who work together on a "personal
and intimate" basis; discipline and harmony among co-workers; personal
36
loyalty; and interference with the government's operations.
By 1978 the public employee's right to speak out in dissent was losing frequently in the courts to the government's interest in suppressing
dissent; the first amendment was not serving as a reliable shield for
whistleblowers. 37 One of Congress' purposes for the Reform Act was to
establish categories of public concern so significant that corresponding
speech is absolutely protected and beyond the reach of the uncertain
Pickering scales.

38

A third factor in the drive for the Reform Act was the recognition
that the Civil Service Commission had a conflict-of-interest. To restore
legitimacy, it was necessary to separate its concurrent management and
employee appeal duties. As President Carter explained, "The Civil Service Commission has acquired inherently conflicting responsibilities: to
help manage the Federal Government and to protect the rights of Federal employees. It has done neither job well. This plan would separate
39
the two functions."
A fourth catalyst was the government's frustration at the cumbersome employee appeal process, which managers criticized as a disincentive to challenging performance deficiencies. In particular, performance
evaluations had only background relevance for decisions affecting withingrade salary levels, and could not be used to justify personnel actions
announce a general standard for First Amendment coverage, the Court explained that once an employee meets the initial burden of establishing dismissal due to free expression, the burden of proof
shifts to the government to prove that the speech impeded the employee's performance or otherwise
interfered with efficient operation of the government. Id.
36 Id. at 570 n.3. Factors suggested to evaluate the criteria included: (1) whether the statements
were directed against persons with whom the speaker would normally be in contact in the course of
his daily work; (2) whether they had an adverse effect on discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers; (3) whether it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to a successful employment relationship; (4) whether the employee's statements
either impeded the proper performance of daily duties or interfered with the address operations of
the agency; (5) whether the statements addressed a matter of public concern.

37 See supra p. II & nn.32-4.
38 See infra p. 16 & nn.62-3.
39 Reorganization Plan 2 of 1978, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., as reprinted in USCCAN at 9801
(1978).
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without triggering a lengthy independent appeals process. 40
Balanced against this emphasis on management's right to fire incompetents was the widespread recognition by expert commentators and
Congress that the routinely miserable fate of whistleblowers was unjust
and a disincentive for employees to serve the public interest. As one
commentator explained in 1977,
[t]heoretically, the present civil service embodies, if not rests upon,
the concept of personal responsibility . . . . At present, however,
because the system operates as a monopoly for those who wield
power within individual agencies, the civil service system has
failed to implement the concept of personal responsibility and has
become instead a vehicle of forcing conformity, a means of coerc4
ing or encouraging illegal or improper conduct. '
Congress recognized that a bureaucracy of "yes-people" is not in the
public interest. The Leahy Report declared,
[t]he code of silence thwarts top management's ability to effectively manage and actually removes the burden of accountability
from their shoulders. Fear of reprisal renders intra-agency communications a sham, and compromises not only the employee,
management and the Code of Ethics, but also the Constitutional
42
function of congressional oversight itself.
In presenting the Administration's civil service reform plan to Congress, Civil Service Commission Chairman Alan Campbell recognized
this theme: "The protection of whistleblowers is, in our judgment, essential to the improvement of the public service. Too often in the past such
employees have experienced reprisals in the form of transfers to remote
locations, demotions, removal of duties and responsibilities, or discharge
'43
from the agency."
Congress recognized that suppressing dissent shrinks the public
treasury as well as the whistleblower's bank account. In the House
markup, Representative Schroeder discussed the potential budgetary impact of further strengthening the bill's whistleblower provisions: "I think
that the potential savings that an amendment like this might incur to the
taxpayer is phenomenal ....
[I]n the long run we are going to find that
44
this is one of the most cost-saving amendments we could adopt."
40 S. REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 39-40, reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 2725, 2761-62
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
41 Bureaucrat, supra note 20, at 31.

42 Leahy Report, supra note 32, at 49.
43 Senate Hearings,supra note 31, at 99 (testimony of Alan Campbell, Chairman, Civil Service

Commission).
44 House Markup, supra note 1, at 22. If anything, since passage of the Reform Act the necessity
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In the Senate Report, it was further emphasized that[p]rotecting employees who disclose government illegality, waste
and corruption is a major step toward a more effective civil service. In the vast Federal bureaucracy it is not difficult to conceal
wrongdoing provided that no one summons the courage to disclose the truth. Whenever misdeeds take place in a Federal
agency, there are employees who know that it has occurred, and
who are outraged by it. What is needed is a means to assure them
that they will not suffer if they help uncover and correct administrative abuses. What is needed is a means to protect the Pentagon
employee who discloses billions of dollars in cost overruns, the
GSA employee who discloses widespread fraud, and the nuclear
engineer who questions the safety of certain nuclear plants. These
conscientious civil servants deserve statutory protection rather
45
than bureaucratic harassment and intimidation.
In an August 24, 1978 "Dear Colleague" letter, a bipartisan coalition of
seventeen Senators representing both the Senate's conservative and liberal wings succinctly summarized the purpose of the final legislative
package,
[to] vindicate the Code of Ethics for Government Service, established by Congress twenty years ago, which demands that all federal employees "Uphold the Constitution, laws and legal
regulations of the United States and all governments therein, and
never be a party of their evasion" and "Expose corruption wherever discovered." Under our amendment, an employee can fulfill
those obligations without putting his or her job and career on the
line.

46

The intensity and scope of congressional support should have sent a clear
message of legislative intent for implementation of specific provisions.
As one commentator explained, "[t]he ideological breadth of the coalition supporting whistleblower protection indicates that the passage of
these provisions is a strong congressional statement in support of the le' '47
gitimacy of whistleblowing.
II.

SCOPE OF THE STATUTORY REMEDY

The whistleblower provision in the Reform Act is one of eleven proof eliminating budget waste is even more compelling, as demonstrated by the Gramm-RudmanHollings legislation.
45 SENATE REPORT, supra note 40, at 8.
46 Reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. S14302-03 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Dear
Colleague Letter].
47 Vaughn, supra note 6, at 619-20.

1986]

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL

hibited personnel practices 48 established to implement merit system principles that are the Act's foundation. 49 These prohibited personnel
practices codify federal employee's civil service rights for the first time as
affirmative defenses to attempted personnel actions. In essence, they represent civil service offenses which Congress enacted "to avoid conduct
which undermines the merit system principles and the integrity of the
merit system." 50
Unquestionably the most widely-discussed of the new rights was the
whistleblowing protection established under 5 USC 2302(b)(8), 5 1 which
prohibits specific forms of retaliation 52 for disclosing information 3 that
48 5 U.S.C. 2302.
49 5 U.S.C. 1101 note. One particular merit principle declares, "[a]ll employees and applicants
for employment should receive fair and equitable treatment in all aspects of personnel management
...with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights," 5 U.S.C. 2301. This incorporates
first amendment rights into the scope of protected conduct. Another merit principle establishes a
public employee's duty to combat government misconduct. "All employees should maintain high
standards of integrity, conduct, and concern for the public interest." 5 U.S.C. 2301(b)(4). The
Leahy Report had defined the "whistleblowing duty" as "the duty of all federal employees to make
known examples of governmental waste, misfeasance, or malfeasance to which they have been exposed during the course of their employment. These disclosures should be made in a manner which
ensures that those in affected policy-making positions are held accountable for determining the nature of the problem and bringing about its resolution." Leahy Report, supra note 32, at 10-11.
50 See supra note 3. In some cases, an employee is compelled to make a whistleblowing disclosure in order to perform his or her job duties, such as writing critical audit reports or testifying to
Congress about agency problems. The Board has ruled repeatedly that an employee is protected for
doing his or her job under 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(10), which makes it prohibited to
discriminate foror against any employee or applicant for employment on the basis of
conduct which does not adversely affect the performance of the employee or applicant
or the performance of others; except that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit an
agency from taking into account in determining suitability or fitness any conviction of
the employee or applicant for any crime under the laws of any State, of the District of
Columbia, or of the United States...
See Fekete v. Department of Justice, 8 M.S.P.B. 130, 131 (1981); Special Counsel v. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 10 M.S.P.B. 331, 332-33 (1981).
51 See supra p. 5 & note 3.
52 "Listed personnel actions" in section 2302(a)(2)(A) include:
(i) an appointment;
(ii) a promotion;
(iii) an action under chapter 75 of this title or other disciplinary or corrective action;
(iv) a detail, transfer, or reassignment;
(v) a reinstatement;
(vi) a restoration;
(vii) a reemployment;
(viii) a performance evaluation under chapter 43 of this title;
(ix) a decision concerning pay, benefits, or awards, or concerning education or training
if the education or training may reasonably be expected to lead to an appointment,
promotion, performance evaluation, or other action described in this subparagraph;
and
(x) any other significant change in duties or responsibilities which is inconsistent with
the employee's salary or grade level;
with respect to an employee in or applicant for, a covered position in an agency ...
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an employee or applicant for a position5 4 reasonably believes evidences 55
a violation of any law, rule, or regulation;5 6 mismanagement, 57 abuse of
authority, 58 gross waste of funds; 59 or substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety. 6° For information whose public release is barred
by statute or by executive order because of national security considerations, whistleblowers are still protected if they exercise their dissent
through the head of the agency or a designated representative, the agency
Inspector General, or the Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protec61
tion Board.
In part, Congress created the whistleblower provision in response to
62
the judicial reluctance to play an activist first amendment role.
Despite congressional intent for the list to be interpreted broadly, as discussed above in practice it is
far from comprehensive and excludes many common forms of harassment. See supra note 16. To
further illustrate, listed personnel actions do not cover what traditionally was one of the ugliest
forms of retaliation-psychiatric fitness-for-duty examinations. Hearingson Whistleblower Protection Act of 1986 before the Subcomm. on Civil Service of the House Post Office and Civil Service
Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 178-79 (1986) (testimony of Robert Vaughn) [hereinafter cited as 1986
Hearings]. Nor does the list include investigations opened on an individual in retaliation for
whistleblowing. The inadvertent loopholes that have resulted from this piecemeal approach to jurisdiction are in sharp contrast to the Department of Labor model, which more simply protects
whistleblowers from "discrimination" due to their protected conduct. 42 U.S.C. 5851(a). Under
this broader approach, there is jurisdiction to challenge nearly any reprisal with measurable impact.
53 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A). The Special Counsel's regulations amplify through a broad definition
of protected speech. Under 5 C.F.R. 1250.3(c), "[a] protected disclosure may be oral or written and
to any person within or outside the agency."
54 5 U.S.C. 2302(a)(2)(A).
55 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8). Although the Special Counsel has not adopted regulations to define this
term, it is clear from the Board's decisions to date that the employee does not have to be "right" or
prove the accuracy of the dissent. Rather, the dissent must be rational, relevant to the categories of
protected speech, and in good faith. Ramos v. FAA, 4 M.S.P.R. 388 (1980); Sowers v. Dept. of
Agriculture, 24 M.S.P.R. 492 (1984); Prescott v. D.H.H.S., 6 M.S.P.R. 252 (1981). See also
Vaughn, supra note 6, at 625-26.
56 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A)(i) and 2302(b)(8)(B)(i).
17 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii). Under the Special Counsel's regulatory definitions, " 'Mismanagement' means wrongful or arbitrary and capricious actions that may have an adverse effect on the
efficient accomplishment of the agency mission." 5 C.F.R. 1250.3(e).
58 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii) and 2302(b)(8)(B)(ii). Under the Special Counsel's definitions,
"'Abuse of authority' means an arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a Federal official or
employee that adversely affects the rights of any person or that results in personal gain or advantage
to himself or to preferred other persons." 5 C.F.R. 1250.3(f).
59 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii) and 2302(b)(8)(B)(ii). Under the regulatory definition, - 'Gross
waste of funds' means unnecessary expenditure of substantial sums of money, or a series of instances
of unnecessary expenditures of smaller amounts." 5 C.F.R. 1250.3(d).
60 5 U.S.C. sections 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii) and 2302(b)(8)(B)(ii). Although there is no regulatory
definition for this term, the legislative history emphasizes that it applies to dissent based on specific
information, rather than general opinions. To illustrate, the Senate Report drew the distinction
between generic opposition to nuclear power and a disclosure of defective piping at a facility. SENATE REPORT, supra note 40, at 21, reprinted in 1978 USCCAN at 2723, 2743.
61 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(B).
62See supra nn.32-8. As summarized succinctly in the Leahy Report, supra note 32, at 47, "[t]he
courts have been reluctant to play an activist role in the whistleblower problem."
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Through the provision, Congress sought to bypass the increasingly uncertain Pickering balancing test by declaring that disclosure of certain
forms of misconduct represents a net public policy benefit, regardless of
the disruptive impact. 63 The only non-jurisdictional precondition is that

the employee satisfy the modest standard of reasonably believing the disclosure provides evidence of the misconduct. As Professor Vaughn
explained,
[a]t the time Congress considered the whistleblower provision, interpretations of the first amendment weighed the government interest in efficient government heavily ....

[I]t was unclear whether

a strong public interest in disclosure would outweigh the resultant
disruption. This uncertainty ...

discouraged disclosure in many

of the circumstances in which Congress believed exposure most
beneficial. Congress, therefore, legislated against weakness in the
first amendment standard and adopted a different approach to proin order to encourage exposure of government
tect employees
64
wrongdoing.
One first amendment barrier that Congress did not at least explicitly
dissolve through statutory language was the difficult burden-of-proof es65
tablished by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy School Districtv. Doyle.
Under the Mt. Healthy standard, the employee must demonstrate a
causal connection between the protected speech and the challenged adverse action. The employee has the burden of proving that protected
activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory
personnel action. 66 Having made that case, the burden of proof then
shifts to the employer, who receives a second chance to justify the personnel action by demonstrating that the same action would have been
taken in the absence of protected conduct, on lawful grounds independent of the dissent.

67

The Mt. Healthy burden makes the Act's goal of whistleblower protection more difficult. 68 However, it is not inconsistent with the congressional fear that employees who deserve to be fired for incompetence
should not be entitled to hide behind the whistleblower shield to avoid
63 As Professor Vaughn explained, "[i]n passing the Act, Congress carefully weighed the possible disruption resulting from a whistleblower's activity. Its action indicated that Congress sought to
reverse the judicial tendency to defer to governmental interests." Vaughn, supra note 6, at 641
n. 148.
64 Id. (footnotes omitted).
65 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
66 Id. at 287.
67 Id.
68 Hearings on the Merit Systems Protection Board, Office of the Special Counsel Before a Subcomm. of the House Govt. OperationsComm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 99-100 (1983) [hereinafter referred to as 1983 House Oversight Hearings] (testimony of Special Counsel K. William O'Connor).
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accountability for their own misconduct. 69 In most contexts, the Mt.
Healthy test has established the ultimate burden to prove causation
70
under the whistleblower provision.

In order to dissolve the organizational conflicts of interest, streamline justified dismissals, and implement the merit system principles
against prohibited personnel practices, the Act established three new administrative institutions out of the old Civil Service Commission. The
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) took over most of the Commission's duties. OPM is responsible for hiring federal employees, representing management's interests in firing or taking other action against them,
and generally administering the civil service system. 7t The Merit Systems Protection Board operates as the independent body that hears employee appeals of disciplinary actions. 72 The Board's Office of Merit
Systems Review and Studies also is responsible for conducting surveys
3
and scholarly research on the merit system in practice.7
The investigating and prosecuting agency that brings cases involving
prohibited personnel practices or other offenses against the merit system
to the Board is the Office of the Special Counsel (OSC). 74 The Special

Counsel has a role similar to that of the General Counsel with the National Labor Relations Board, or that of the U.S. Attorney with a
court. 75 As Representative Schroeder summarized in retrospect, the Of-

fice of the Special Counsel was designed as a unique creature-part investigator and prosecutor, part legal aid support for federal employees, and
69 Vaughn, supra note 6, at 644-45 n. 167.
Finally, it should be noted that this section is a prohibition against reprisals. The section should not be construed as protecting an employee who is otherwise engaged in
misconduct, or who is incompetent, from appropriate disciplinary action. If, for example, an employee has had several years of inadequate performance, or unsatisfactory
performance ratings, or if an employee has engaged in action which would constitute
dismissal for cause, the fact that the employee "blows the whistle" on his agency after
the agency has begun to initiate disciplinary action against the employee will not protect the employee against such disciplinary action. Whether the disciplinary action is a
result of the individual's performance on the job, or whether it is a reprisal because the
employee chose to criticize the agency, is a matter of judgment to be determined in the
first instance by the agency, and ultimately by the Special Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board. SENATE REPORT, supra note 40, at 122.
70 The Board adopted the Mt. Healthy standard in Gerlach v. FTC, M.S.P.B. Docket No.
DC07528010020 (Dec. 15, 1981). But see infra p. 24 & nn.115-17, 216-17 (for Senior Executive
Service employees an agency only has to demonstrate that it "could have" taken the personnel action
on alternative grounds). See also infra note 279 (Special Counsel excused from Mt. Healthy burden
when prosecuting disciplinary complaints).
7' 5 U.S.C. 1101-05.
72 Supra note 11.

73 5 U.S.C. 1205(a)(3).
74 5 U.S.C. 1206.
75Eastwood, supra note 10, at 95-6.
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part regulator. 76

In order to perform this unique role, the Special Counsel is responsible for five functions under the Reform Act. First, the OSC has a
mandatory duty to investigate all allegations of prohibited personnel
practice to the extent necessary to determine whether there are "reasonable grounds to believe" an illegal reprisal "has occurred, exists, or is to
be taken." '77 Second, at the completion of the investigation the Special
Counsel may seek relief for the employee, initially by issuing recommendations for voluntary agency compliance and, when necessary, through
filing a corrective action complaint with the MSPB for enforcement of
the recommendations. 78 Third, the Special Counsel has the authority to
petition the Board for injunctive relief through a stay, to prevent imminent retaliation or restore the employee to his or her job while the OSC
investigates. 79 Fourth, the Office prosecutes disciplinary complaints
against federal managers who engage in prohibited personnel practices,
refuse to comply with Board orders for relief, or who violate statutes
80
related to the merit system, such as the Hatch Act.
Fifth, the Special Counsel has a parallel duty which is separate from
defending employees against repressive personnel practices. The Office
of the Special Counsel screens whistleblowing disclosures and orders
agency chiefs to investigate the challenges that have merit.8 1 If the disclosure would be protected against reprisal, the Special Counsel must
forward the disclosure to the agency head for a response.82 There are no
restrictions on the format or quality of the agency reply.8 3 In this circumstance, Congress intended only to provide an "early warning system" of
76 Hearings on the Whistleblower Protection Provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
Before the House Post Office and Civil Service Comm. Subcomm. on Civil Service, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 193 (1980) (opening statement of Representative Schroeder). At the Senate Markup sessions,
Administration spokesman and Civil Service Commission Vice Chairman Jules Sugarman explained,
[T]he [S]pecial [C]ounsel is really carrying the case for the employee in this situation.
The employee doesn't need his own attorney to obtain this [stay] because the [S]pecial
[C]ounsel has become, in effect, his counsel, to pursue his interest before the Merit
System Protection Board. It is unlikely that the employee would even need to appear at
all in that kind of situation.
Markup Session on S. 2640 before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
91-2 (1978).
77 5 U.S.C. 1206(a)(1).
78 5 U.S.C. 1206(c)(1).
79 5 U.S.C. 1208.
80 5 U.S.C. 1206(g).
81 5 U.S.C. section 1206(b)(3)(A)(i). Under 5 U.S.C. 1206(c)(2), the Special Counsel is required
to become an institutional whistleblower if evidence of illegality beyond the civil service laws is
discovered during a prohibited personnel practice investigation. The Special Counsel must forward
the evidence for investigation by the head of the agency.
82 5 U.S.C. 1206(b)(2). For the definition of protected whistleblowing see supra p. 3 & note 3.
83 5 U.S.C. 1206(b)(7).
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budding problems, serious enough to place agency leadership on notice
and to require acknowledgement.

8 4

When the Special Counsel determines that there is a "substantial
likelihood" the whistleblower's charges are accurate, a more intensive
reform process is triggered. 85 The agency head must investigate and reply within sixty days in a report whose contents are specified by statute,
including the issues and evidence that were investigated, the methodology for the probe, a summary of the evidence obtained, findings of fact
and law, and a summary of corrective action to solve any verified
problems. 86 After the Special Counsel evaluates the report for completeness and reasonableness, it is sent to the President, Congress and the
whistleblower.8 7 The Special Counsel must maintain a copy of each re88
port in a public file.

The purpose of the OSC whistleblowing disclosure channel was "to
encourage employees to give the government the first crack at cleaning
its own house before igniting the glare of publicity to force correction." 8 9
Indeed, if administered in good faith, the Reform Act mechanism offers
strategic benefits for a whistleblower to be effective in his or her dissent.
It could offer an opportunity to gain the legally-binding judgment of an
objective third party that the whistleblower's charges must be taken seriously. At a minimum, this maximizes the public dissenter's credibility
and helps to reduce isolation. The OSC evaluation that there is a "substantial likelihood" the allegations are well-taken is the bureaucratic
equivalent of a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval" for that particular dissent. 90
Congress sent a strong message that it expected an activist role from
the OSC in carrying out these duties. The House Report summarized the
Office's mission as the first legislatively designed office in history
"designed to ensure that employees are fairly protected." 9' The Senate
Report took an even stronger stand, characterizing the Special Counsel
as "a vigorous protector ...

responsible for safeguarding the effective

operation of the merit system principles in practice." ' 92
14

124 CONG. REC. H11822 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Schroeder).

85 5 U.S.C. 1206(b)(3).

86 5 U.S.C. 1206(b)(4).
87

5 U.S.C. 1206(b)(5)(A) and 1206(b)(6).

88 5 U.S.C. 1206(d).
89Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 46, at S14303.
90 Further, since under 5 U.S.C. 1206(b) the Special Counsel can only refer dissent for agency
investigation that would qualify for protected speech, the whistleblowing disclosure channel can also
serve to establish the first element of a retaliation. See infra note 296.
91 H.R. REP. No. 14303, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as HOUSE
REPORT].
92 SENATE REPORT,

supra note 40, at 6-7.
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Unfortunately, the Act essentially places the Special Counsel on the
honor system for compliance with the legislative intent. The statute provides no standards of accountability for the conduct of OSC investigations, and the Merit Systems Protection Board consistently has declined
to provide any rights for complainants that would restrict the Special
Counsel's discretion whether and how to pursue evidence. 93 Similarly,
the Special Counsel is under no duty to prosecute or seek a stay in a
94
particular case, regardless of the facts.
Aggrieved whistleblowers dissatisfied with the Special Counsel's
performance have no opportunity for meaningful judicial review. As the
District of Columbia Circuit explained in Borrell v. United States International Communications Agency, 95
[j]udicial review of the OSC's decision not to investigate or to
prosecute is limited, at most, to insuring compliance with the statutory requirements of an inquiry into employee allegations to the
extent necessary to determine if the allegations are meritorious
and of a brief statement of reasons for terminating an investigation ....
Congress did not mean to allow the district courts any
over the way in which the
extensive supervisory jurisdiction
96
enforced.
are
mandates
CSRA's
The courts have recognized their hands are tied too tightly to reliably affect even the most indefensible OSC behavior. In Wren v. Merit
Systems Protection Board,9 7 the D.C. Circuit found that the Special
Counsel illegally had refused to conduct an investigation, erroneously interpreted the statute to create an improper basis to avoid investigating,
and illegally failed to explain to the complainant the OSC's reasons for
closing the case. 9 8 As the court sympathetically observed,
[t]he petitioner understandably wants some remedy for the OSC's
failure to perform its statutory duty to initiate some kind of inquiry into the merits of an allegation for whistleblowing. As we
see it, this is a nondiscretionary aspect of the OSC's responsibility.
93 OSC v. Department of Commerce, 85 F.M.S.R. 5114, M.S.P.B. No. HQ12088410025 (Feb.
27, 1985) (OSC investigations are carried out independent of the Board, which lacks the authority to
direct their conduct); OSC v. HUD, 15 M.S.P.R. 204 (1983) (Since the Special Counsel is analogous
to a prosecuting attorney, there is no Board authority to supervise the conduct of OSC investigations); Matter of Kass, 2 M.S.P.B. 251, 2 M.S.P.R. 79 (1980) (The nature and extent of OSC investigations is a matter of the Special Counsel's independent judgment).
94 Frazier v. M.S.P.B., 672 F.2d 150, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Patrick v. Department of Transportation, 6 M.S.P.R. 213 (1981). (A complainant cannot compel the OSC to seek corrective action if
the Special Counsel declines to do so.)
95 682 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
96

Id. at 988.

97 681 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
98Id. at 874.
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Seemingly, then, there should be a remedy for petitioners where
the OSC has failed to perform even that initial inquiry into the
whistleblowing action, and its reasons for inaction are legally
invalid. 99

Nonetheless, the court could not find one, besides the admittedly pessimistic suggestion to seek a writ of mandamus compelling the Special
Counsel to conduct a preliminary inquiry.I°0 The Wren court concluded
that "[b]y failing to investigate petitioner's complaint and to issue a valid
statement of reasons for termination, the OSC has not fulfilled its charge
and has thereby cast doubt upon a new and promising statutory system
for protecting whistleblowers."''
The lack of OSC accountability to complainants leaves certain
whistleblowers vulnerable to losing access to their rights for protection
against specific forms of retaliation. The Special Counsel has a monopoly on CSRA remedies for many of the most common reprisal techniques, as well as for all stay petitions. Employees can raise an alleged
prohibited personnel practice as an affirmative defense in appeals of disci02
plinary actions proposing suspensions of greater than fourteen days,1
04
lack of within-grade pay increases, 10 3 and similar personnel actions.
In other cases, the personnel action could be barred under the
whistleblower provision and enforced by the Special Counsel. But the
victim does not have a private right of action to allege the prohibited
personnel practice to the Board because there are no appeal rights for the
disputed personnel action. 10 5 The courts have not been any more receptive than the Board to whistleblowers seeking a forum for their rights
after the Special Counsel turned them away. It has been uniformly held
that the Act does not create a private right of action in court to enforce
prohibited personnel practices, beyond remedies available through the
06
Board and the Special Counsel.
99 Id. at 875.
100 Id. at 875-76 n.9. While the court explained that "a strong case can be made" for mandamus,
it prefaced the analysis by conceding "substantial precedent ...that federal mandamus does not
ordinarily lie under 28 U.S.C. 1361 to compel prosecutions or even investigations." Id. (citations
omitted).
1ot Id. at 875.
102 5 U.S.C. 7512. For lesser disciplinary actions, the employee is entitled to notice and adequate
time to respond within the agency. But there is no jurisdiction for appeal to the Board under 5
U.S.C. 7701. 5 U.S.C. 7503.
103 Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency, I M.S.P.R. 505, 1 M.S.P.B. 489 (1980).
104 See Maroldo, An Overview of MSPB Appellate Jurisdiction, 81 F.M.S.R. v-25 through v-27
(Sept. 1981).
105 See supra nn.102, 104.
106See, e.g., Borrell, supra note 95; Cutts v. Fowler, 692 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Braun v.
United States, 707 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1983); Hallock v. Moses, 731 F.2d 754 (11th Cir. 1984);
Poorsina v. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 726 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1984).
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Personnel actions where the MSPB does not have jurisdiction to
hear an employee's prohibited personnel practice allegation include such
common tactics as temporary or permanent transfers or reassignments; 10 7 failure to provide benefits, awards, or training if the latter
could affect a subsequent personnel action; 0 8 and significant changes in
duties or responsibilities inconsistent with the employee's salary or grade
level. 10 9 For any administrative injunctive relief or for personnel actions
like these, it is the Special Counsel or nothing for whistleblowers.
Because of the lack of meaningful judicial review for OSC failures to
perform legally-mandated duties," 0 the result is that the Special Counsel
has the discretion to violate the whistleblower statute at whim in virtually any case. And as seen above, for some of the most common reprisals
the only way to enforce whistleblowing rights is through a corrective action complaint filed by the Office of the Special Counsel.
III.

TRACK RECORD TO DATE

By any reasonable standard, the track record of the Reform Act to
date has been an utter failure in achieving the goal of increased
whistleblower protection. In reported decisions of the Board since 1979,
dissenters exercising their appeal rights have prevailed in appeals only
four times through the whistleblower defense." 'I And even then, the
legal "victories" could prove to be hollow after the employee returned to
a hostile bureaucracy." 12 If anything, the Board has attempted to inten107 5 U.S.C. 2302(a)(2)(A)(iv). See, e.g., Crary v. Dept. of Defense, Air Force, 85 F.M.S.R. 1184
(1985) (transfer not appealable); Langster v. D.H.H.S., 10 M.S.P.B. 256, 11 M.S.P.R. 295 (1982)
(reassignment not appealable).
108 5 U.S.C. 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix).
109 5 U.S.C. 2302(a)(2)(A)(x).

110 See supra p. 21-2 & nn.97-101.

I Anderson v. Dept. of Agriculture, 82 F.M.S.R. 5043 (1982); Plaskett v. D.H.H.S., 82
F.M.S.R. 5095 (1982); Spadaro v. Dept. of Interior, Office of Surface Mining, 18 M.S.P.R. 462, 83
F.M.S.R. 5426 (1983); Sowers v. Dept. of Agriculture, 24 M.S.P.R. 492 (1984).
112 While Anderson v. Dept. of Agriculture, supra, was a victory initially for a whistleblower, the
relief was short-lived and fragile. Anderson was removed from his GS-9 Civil Engineering Technician position in the Lolo National Forest in Montana effective July 21, 1980 for "failure to report
after his reassignment to the Klamath National Forest" in Northern California. Anderson protested
that his removal was in reprisal for his whistleblowing disclosures of mismanagement and waste.
The Board agreed, cancelling the removal action and ordering USDA to cease retaliating against
him for protected activities.
Upon Anderson's reinstatement to duty, he alleged that the agency continued its campaign of
reprisal and harassment by placing him on a restricted sick leave status (requiring documentation for
every absence), restricting his use of annual leave, restricting his use of flexi-time, presenting him
with unusually specific job description and performance appraisal criteria, delaying his back pay
award, and issuing him disciplinary suspensions following his reinstatement. Anderson filed a petition for compliance to effect agency compliance with the final order. Subsequently, the Board declined to find that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) had failed to comply with
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sify the trend to disqualify dissent on the ostensible grounds of its disruptive impact," 3 despite the congressional intent for the whistleblowing
14
provision to bypass that hurdle.'
In the recent Berube decision,' '5 with respect to Senior Executive
Service ("SES") managers the Board decreased the employer's Mt.
Healthy burden from having to prove the whistleblower "would have"
been terminated on other grounds to the far more relaxed standard of
demonstrating that the personnel action could have occurred.," 6 Even
beyond the obvious practical handicap this shift represents, the Berube
standard inherently is grounds for whistleblowers to shiver. It is an invitation for Big Brother to join the appeals process. Nearly everyone has a
skeleton in some closet from some time, if the government chooses to
snoop with sufficient zeal. Since the "could have" standard does not require an employer in fact to have considered this information in the personnel action, there is an incentive to gather the basis after the fact.
Under the Berube doctrine, employees who appeal and raise the
whistleblowing defense risk extensive investigations into their private
lives. 17
The most conspicuous vacuum in the Act's remedial provisions concerns the Office of the Special Counsel. Since its creation, the OSC has
turned down ninety-nine percent of whistleblower cases without attempting any disciplinary or corrective action, 1 8 and experienced practitioners
the earlier reinstatement order. This decision was reviewed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Anderson v. U.S.D.A., No. 85-2091, slip op. (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 1986).
Meanwhile, in May 1984, the USDA had issued another removal action. In defense, Anderson
alleged renewed retaliation by the agency and failure by the agency to follow its own regulations.
The Board upheld the removal, denying the affirmative defense of reprisal activity. Anderson then
sought judicial review of the Board's decision on the second removal action. Anderson v. USDA,
No. 85-2092, slip op. (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 1986). The appeals to the Federal Circuit were consolidated, and the Court held that there was an inadequate basis for reversal of the Board's conclusion in
the petition for compliance, and that Anderson failed to prove retaliatory intent in the second removal action. Anderson is currently considering Supreme Court review of the Appeal Court's
decision.
113 Brown v. FAA, 15 M.S.P.R. 224, 83 F.M.S.R. 7027 (1983), affmd, in part and rev'd in part.
Brown v. Dept. of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 543 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See also infra note 313.
114 See supra p. 17-18 & nn.62-64. Anderson v. USDA, supra note 112.
"1
Berube v. General Services Administration, M.S.P.B. No. DC07528410055 (slip op. May 20,
1986) [hereinafter cited as Berube].
116 Id., dissenting opinion of Vice Chair Johnson, at 7-13.
117 Before Berube, supra note 115, agencies engaged in retaliatory investigations at their own
risks: the employee could cite the witchhunt as evidence of animus and the investigation as a reprisal
that would not have occurred in the absence of dissent. After Berube, motive is no longer relevantthere is no reason not to "go fishing," since any ground that could justify dismissal is satisfactory,
whether or not the agency would have sought the information in the absence of dissent.
118 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINANTS
RARELY QUALIFY FOR OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL PROTECTION 18 (May 10, 1985) [hereinafter cited as 1985 GAO REPORT).
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of federal personnel law commonly advise clients that it is in their best
interest to avoid the Office unless there is nothing left to lose. 1 9 During
its first seven years, the OSC filed only ten corrective action complaints,
all of which were turned down by the Board. 120 The OSC has not filed a
corrective action complaint since 1981, and none during the term of Special Counsel K. William O'Connor.121

After an early flurry of successful efforts to obtain stays, the previous two Special Counsels have allowed that provision of the Reform Act
to become practically dormant. Alex Kozinski, the Special Counsel from
June 1981 until his August 1982 resignation, filed only four stay requests. 122 His successor, Mr. O'Connor, the Special Counsel until June
1986, filed 17 stay requests during his first three years in office,' 23 compared with up to 20 stay requests per year even during the OSC's embry24

onic years. 1

Employees have perceived the frailty of these new paper rights and
increasingly are unwilling to risk exercising them. A 1980 MSPB survey
of federal employees revealed the immensity of the challenge to achieve
strengthened freedom of speech. Unfortunately, the findings of a 1983
followup survey were even more significant: from the standpoint of employee confidence freedom of speech is weaker since the Act's passage.
In 1980 nineteen percent of employees who witnessed but did not report
fraud, waste and abuse cited fear of reprisal as the reason for remaining
silent.
'"9

25

By 1983, the figure had jumped to thirty-seven percent.' 26 In

1985 Hearings, supra note 2, at 205-37 generally.

120 1985 Hearings, supra note 2, at 240 (testimony of William O'Connor).
121

Id.

122 Letter and enclosure from Alex Kozinski, Special Counsel, to Patricia Schroeder, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Civil Service, House Committee on post Office and Civil Service, enclosure at
1-2 (April 30, 1982).
122 Hearings on Civil Service Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Civil Service of the House Post

Office and Civil Service Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 484 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Hearings]
(testimony of K. William O'Connor); OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, A Report to Congressfrom

the Office of the Special Counsel Fiscal Year 1984, 10 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 OSC ANNUAL REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, A Report to the Congressfrom the Office of the

Special Counsel Fiscal Year 1985, 8-9 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 1985 OSC ANNUAL REPORT].
124Letter from Ernest Hadley and Thomas Devine to Honorable Patricia Schroeder, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Civil Service, House Post Office and Civil Service Comm. (April 5, 1983) [hereinafter cited as GAP Survey Letter], reprinted in 1983 Hearings, supra n.123, at 643-50. In 1979
while the OSC was establishing its operation, the Special Counsel filed nine stay requests. During
1980, a period in which the Office had to furlough nearly all of its staff for a two month period due to
a budget recission, the OSC filed 20 stay requests. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, A REPORT
TO CONGRESS FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL; FISCAL YEAR 1980, 7 (1981) [herein-

after cited as 1980 OSC ANNUAL REPORT].
125 OFFICE OF MERIT SYSTEMS REVIEW AND STUDIES, MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
WHISTLEBLOWING

AND THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE 27, 29 (1981)

[hereinafter cited as INITIAL

MSPB SURVEY].
126 OFFICE OF MERIT SYSTEMS REVIEW AND STUDIES, MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
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part the increasing chill may be due to high hopes created by the Act's
passage, combined with the unabated rate of perceived retaliation. In
1980, twenty percent of those who blew the whistle reported actually
suffering reprisal,1 27 compared to twenty-three percent by 1983.128
Although Special Counsel O'Connor testified that whistleblowers' fear of
reprisal was decreasing,1 29 a January 16, 1985 Merit Systems Protection
Board press release summarizing the latest survey results draws the clear
conclusion: "[t]here has been a significant increase in fear of reprisals,
'1 30
the reason given for not having reported fraud, waste and abuse.'
Surprisingly, fear of retaliation is not the main reason employees
remain silent after witnessing misconduct. In both surveys the primary
reason would-be whistleblowers decided not to become involved was that
they "did not think anything would be done to correct the activity," despite their initiatives. That was the primary reason listed by fifty-three
percent of respondents in 1980,131 and sixty-one percent in 1983.132 The
public policy consequences of this fear and cynicism illustrate both the
extent of the failure and the desirability of achieving Congress' intent.
As one of the 1980 and 1983 MSPB study authors analysed, an extrapolation of survey results would demonstrate that of around a half million
federal employees who annually believe they know of one or more examples of illegality or wasteful activity, approximately seventy percent keep
133
it to themselves.
IV.

TECHNIQUES TO FRUSTRATE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

As discussed above, the Reform Act represents an overwhelming
congressional mandate to help whistleblowers. Its failure demands an
inquiry. With respect to the Office of the Special Counsel, a detailed
comparison of congressional intent with the OSC's modus operandi
reveals two fundamental lessons: (1) without strong judicial review, legBLOWING THE WHISTLE IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF

1980

AND 1983 SURVEY FINDINGS 31, 34 (1984) [HEREINAFTER CITED AS FOLLOWUP MSPB SURVEY].
127 INITIAL MSPB SURVEY, supra note 125, at 3.
128 FOLLOWUP MSPB SURVEY, supra note 126, at 6-7.

1291986 Hearings,supra note 51, at 44-48.
130 Quoted in Id., at 116.

Simultaneously, fewer employees are attempting to gain assistance

through the Special Counsel. In 1980, when the OSC was still in its infancy, 1,982 federal employees
sought relief from alleged prohibited personnel practices. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, A

Report to the Congressfrom the Office of the Special Counsel, Fiscal Year 1980 23 (1980). By 1985,
the number of OSC complainants had dropped to 1,280. 1985 OSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
123, at 12.
131 INITIAL MSPB SURVEY, supra note 125, at 2.
132 FOLLOWUP MSPB SURVEY, supra note 126, at 31, 34.
133 Palguta, FederalAgency Mechanisms that Encourage Dissent, 4 IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE 25 (September, 1985).
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islative intent is no match for administrative abuse of discretion; and
(2) the legislative discretion of a bureaucratic champion are no substitute
34
for enforceable rights.
Since a primary goal of whistleblowing is to challenge abuses of
power, it is highly ironic that public dissenters are subject to the discretion of an agency whose history for the last five years has been rife with
abuse of authority. In fact, the hostility to dissent of two recent Special
Counsels was so severe that the frustration of legislative intent was almost predictable. 13 5 When Congress considered the role of Special Counsel, the drafters were inspired by the "Saturday Night Massacre" records
of the Watergate Special Prosecutor to create an office independent of the
President. 1 36 Congress did not intend what has occurred at OSC since
1981 to ever happen. The Special Counsels used their broad grant of
authority to substitute their own agenda for congressional intent.
In 1978, the sponsors did not intend the kind of leadership displayed
by Special Counsel Alex Kozinski, who taught a course for federal managers on how to fire whistleblowers and other employees without being
caught by the Office of the Special Counsel. 137 Mr. Kozinski also tutored
134 Since whistleblowers do not have jurisdiction to appeal retaliatory personnel actions such as
transfer or loss of duties, supra notes 102, 104, in those situations their only recourse under the
Reform Act is to seek help from the OSC, and their rights are not stronger than the Special Counsel's sympathies. Whistleblowers' vulnerability to a hostile Special Counsel's judgment leaves little
realistic basis for confidence in the theoretical protections available under section 2302. Because
there has not been any corrective action litigation since 1981, whistleblowers have little or no legal
rights to challenge the Special Counsel's exercise of discretion. See supra p. 21-5 & nn.95-1 10 and
note 121. As Representative Schroeder summarized with respect to Mr. Kozinski,
The data provided by Mr. Kozinski indicated that no legitimate whistleblowers existed
in the federal government ....
In fact, I believe there are legitimate whistleblowers in
the federal government. My experience as Chairwoman of the House Subcommittee on
Civil Service has convinced me that a substantial number of prohibited personnel practices are committed each week in the government. I have witnessed separations and
reassignments of employees because their supervisors believe they blew the whistle or
could not be trusted due to their work for the previous administration. Letter to Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, from Representative Patricia Schroeder (September 5, 1985).
135 See supra p. 5 note 2. In the 1985 confirmation hearings for his nomination to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Mr. Kozinski explained that the only reason he did not bring any cases on
behalf of whistleblowers during his tenure was that "I did not want to bring bad cases." Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments Before the Senate Judiciary Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm. 100 [hereinafter cited as Confirmation Hearings](testimony of Mr. Kozinski). Senate dissatisfaction with Mr. Kozinski's candor defending his OSC record resulted in his recall for a second
hearing. The relatively narrow final confirmation margin, 54-43, indicated severe congressional dissatisfaction with trends at the Office, as well. The Los Angeles Daily Journal, Dec. 2, 1985, at 1, col.
1.
136 House Markup, supra note 1, at 55 (remarks of Rep. Ford).
137 The primary course material was a manual entitled How to Avoid Committing ProhibitedPersonnel Practices in the Reagan Era: An OSC Seminar. The manual outlined the steps in an OSC
investigation and warned of the types of behavior that Special Counsel investigators pursued to
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Secretary Watt's managers at the Department of Interior on how to
frame their charges to successfully fire a whistleblower without running
afoul of the Civil Service Reform Act. Although the employee's case was
pending before the OSC, Mr. Kozinski had several meetings with the
agency managers, lecturing them on how to draft the charges to avoid
conceding a first amendment violation. The managers wanted to charge
the dissenter with blowing the whistle on national television. 138 Despite
this assistance and further help when the OSC closed the case, the employee appealed and won before the MSPB on his whistleblowing
39

defense. 1

Congress did not foresee the hostility toward dissent of Mr. Kozinski's successor as Special Counsel, Mr. William O'Connor, who characterized whistleblowers as "malcontents" and illustrated his points about
whistleblowers with references to bag ladies and mental health patients.
Among Mr. O'Connor's kindest comments about whistleblowers was to
label them as "informers" and "bystanders" to the prohibited personnel
practices taken against them. 14 Contrary to the legislative intent of the
Reform Act that federal employees work within the system, Mr.
14
O'Connor has advised would-be whistleblowers to keep quiet.
Officially,

both

Mr.

Kozinski

and Mr.

O'Connor

favored

prove retaliatory motive through circumstantial evidence. It described the types of documentary
evidence sought by OSC investigators. The manual included a reminder that employees did not fear
termination on performance grounds, and included model unsatisfactory performance appraisals
prepared by Mr. Kozinski to use against his own staff. How to Avoid Committing ProhibitedPersonnel Practices in the Reagan Era: An OSC Seminar, presented to the Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. (April 7, 1982). See also Sinzinger, Kozinski's Good Thing, FEDERAL
TIMES 2 (May 3, 1982); Sinzinger, Tactless in Technicolor, FEDERAL TIMES 2 (May 10, 1982). Mr.
Kozinski insisted that his purpose was to avoid illegality, rather than to instruct managers how to
successfully circumvent the civil service laws against reprisal-as had been the goal of the MalekMay ManuaL Confirmation Hearings, supra note 135, at 96.
138 Although Mr. Kozinski testified that he did not recall any incident of the type, two other OSC
staff officials who were at the meetings provided contrary statements to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Confirmation Hearings,supra note 135, at 749-50 (affidavit of Mary Eastwood); and Letter
to Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, from Jessie James (Sept. 12,
1985): "Mr. Kozinski's convenient lapse of memory with regard to his discussions with an agency
and its admission during those discussions that it was taking action against an employee because he
continued to 'go to the press,' is strangely odd, especially since Mr. Kozinski presided over all meetings with the agency and advised the agency to rethink its actions and justification. I find it difficult
to believe that Mr. Kozinski forgot these discussions."
139 Spadaro, supra note 111.
140 1985 Hearings, supra note 2 at 253-54, 259; 1986 Hearings,supra note 51, at 9-10.
141 Compare the Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 46: "[w]e hope to encourage employees to give
the government the first crack at cleaning its own house before igniting the glare of publicity to force
correction" with Mr. O'Connor's statement that if he were an attorney advising whistleblowers, "I'd
say that unless you're in a position to retire or are independently wealthy, don't do it. Don't put
your head up, because it will get blown off." Quoted in Statement of Senator Carl Levin, issued at
introduction of S. 2014, at 8 [hereinafter cited as Levin Statement].
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whistleblowing. They each defended their failure to file a corrective action complaint on behalf of any whistleblower with the same excusethat neither met one who deserved or needed litigation under the Reform
Act's remedial legislation. 142 Those explanations were not credible. A
review of the OSC record since 1981 reveals a blueprint for bureaucratic
techniques to defeat congressional intent.
A. Investigations
Under 5 U.S.C. 1206(a), the Special Counsel is required to receive
any allegation of prohibited personnel practice and investigate to the extent necessary to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe an illegal reprisal occurred, exists, or is to be taken. 143 If the Special
Counsel closes the case, the Office is required to explain the reasons to
the complainant. I" The special Counsel does not have to wait for allegations of reprisal. The Office can initiate and conduct investigations to
145
look for prohibited personnel practices.
According to legislative history, this portion of the Reform Act
designates the Special Counsel's primary responsibility-to act as an investigator and enforcement officer of merit system principles in practice. 14 6 Congress was clear that it expected the OSC to take an activist
role. As the Senate Report pointed out: "The Special Counsel should
not passively await employee complaints, but rather, vigorously pursue
merit system abuses on a systematic basis. He should seek action by the
Merit Board to eliminate both individual instances of merit abuse, and
147
patterns of prohibited personnel practices."
While Congress recognized that in some instances a full investigation would not be appropriate, the legislative history instructs that in
every case "some preliminary inquiry will ...

be necessary ...

to deter-

mine whether a charge warrants a thorough inquiry." 14s Finally,
although there is broad discretion as to the format, when a case is closed
the Special Counsel has to inform the complainant why the Office did not
149
help an employee who complained of prohibited personnel practices.
That was the theory. The reality is a far different story. According
to a 1985 GAO report, the Special Counsel conducted actual investigaSupra note 135.
U.S.C. 1206(a)(1).
144 5 U.S.C. 1206(a)(2).
145 5 U.S.C. 1206(a)(3).
146 See supra note 92.
147 SENATE REPORT, supra note 40, at 32.
148Id. at 32.
149 Id.
142

143 5
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tions for only eight percent of employees who requested assistance.15 0
How did an office designed to vigorously investigate prohibited personnel
practices manage so routinely to avoid doing it? Twelve illustrative examples of practices that either violate the mandatory requirements of the
Reform Act or subvert the legislative intent help provide the answer.
First, the Special Counsel has closed cases without meeting the complainants and without conducting any inquiry at all, contrary to explicit
legislative instructions. That happened at rates of one-third to nearly
half of the complainants for sustained periods."5 ' One whistleblower recounted calling the Special Counsel eighty-nine times before he got
through to the OSC staffer responsible for his case, who informed him
52
that it had been closed. 1

Second, when the Special Counsel has opened an inquiry, on occasion OSC investigators explicitly discouraged employees from presenting
53

evidence. 1

Third, the OSC has frequently refused to contact witnesses proposed
by the whistleblowers, and on occasion after opening a case has failed to
1 54
talk to any of the complainant's proposed witnesses.
Fourth, in 1981 the Office had a policy to close all cases in which the
reprisal allegations were not adequately supported in the original complaint. As a result, according to a 1983 GAO report, "cases were
processed in assembly-line fashion" and "many potentially valid cases
55
were closed prematurely."'
Fifth, the Special Counsel routinely has turned down whistleblowers
through form letters that state no more than the employee's name, his or
1985 GAO REPORT, supra note 118, at iii, 9.
111 GAP Survey Letter, supra note 124, reprinted in 1983 Hearings, supra note 123, at 647.
152 1986 Hearings, supra note 51, at 117 (cited in testimony of Thomas Devine).
150

153 1983 Hearings,supra note 123, at 627 (testimony of Fund for Constitutional Government et
aL.) As Ernest Fitzgerald explained about his initial attempts to persuade the Special Counsel to
pursue the Spanton case, see infra p. 46-7 & nn.252-54,
When I was first interviewed by the OSC, Office of Special Counsel, investigators, they
were disinterested. I kept trying to give the investigators documentary evidence and
they kept giving it back to me. I finally insisted that they carry away some of the
documents but never did succeed in getting these particular investigators to discuss the
substance of the evidence. All they would say was that they could not see any "nexus"
between the bad treatment of Mr. Spanton and his attempts to save taxpayers' money.
Fitzgerald, Pentagon Procurement Pollution, in THE PROCUREMENT OF AMERICA'S
DEFENSE: 1986 AND BEYOND, Symposium at Washington and Lee University 56
(May 31, 1986).
154 Id. See, e.g., infra n.195.
155 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EFFECTS OF FISCAL YEAR 1982 BUDGET
CUTS ON THE MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD AND THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL

15 (April 8, 1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 GAO Report]. To illustrate the standards for declining
to investigate, GAO reported, "Investigators in Atlanta did not pursue cases within the city limits
because even $.50 bus fares required advance approval." Id. at 17.

1986]

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL

her former position, the nature of the personnel action, and the fact that
1 56
the complainant lost under the relevant statutory provision.
Sixth, Mr. O'Connor wasted scarce resources of the Office by duplicating prohibited personnel practice investigations where other agencies
found reprisals. Significantly, on several occasions Mr. O'Connor or Mr.
Kozinski contradicted findings of retaliation that other offices had confirmed, such as agency managers or Inspectors General who could be
57
expected to be more sympathetic to management interests. 1
Seventh, the Office has engaged in the discriminatory use of
polygraphs, a questionable practice in the first place. Although the Special Counsel uses lie detectors to screen whistleblower complaints, the
Office has refused requests of whistleblowers to test the veracity of man58
agement testimony through polygraphs.
Eighth, frequently the Office has refused to share information from
the OSC investigative file with the victim. This has occurred even when
the investigative file contained information important for the
159
whistleblower's case in separate legal appeals of the personnel action.
Ninth, by contrast, the Office of the Special Counsel has used employees' closed case files as the basis for testifying against whistleblowers
after those employees had given up on the initial reprisal and were seeking new government positions. In one case the Special Counsel used the
closed case files as the basis for recommending against a whistleblower in
an OPM background security investigation.' 60 The incident was not
156 1985 Hearings,supra note 2, at 254 (statement of Rep. Schroeder); Levin Statements, supra
note 141, at 8: "[T]hat explanation can be one sentence long, for example stating that the OSC
believes that action taken against the complainant was carried out for 'legitimate management reasons.' Such an explanation is not very useful to a complainant who needs to know why his or her
case is not being pursued." See, e.g., text accompanying notes 196, 233.
157 Compare, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: JOHN V. GRAZIANO (August 6,
1982), finding a prohibited personnel practice, with the Special Counsel's finding of "no credible
evidence" that any prohibited personnel practices occurred at the Department of Agriculture Office
of Inspector General. Despite a three-volume report with contrary conclusions, Mr. O'Connor concluded, "[tihe bottom line in this matter insofar as prohibited personnel practice allegations are
concerned is that Mr. Graziano has been publicly pilloried for alleged violations which are not supported, but rather refuted, by investigation." Quoted in The Washington Post, July 4, 1983, at A13,
col. 1. A random survey of whistleblowers whose cases were rejected by Mr. Kozinski revealed that
seventy percent who sought relief in alternative forums were successful. See also infra nn.225-39.
151 See, e.g., Affidavit of Vincent Laubach (June 12, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Laubach Affidavit]. See also Memorandum to Thomas Devine from Francis Serra re: OSC Polygraph Usage (May
1, 1986).
159 Report of Interview between Ernest Hadley, GAP, and Tina Hobson, complainant before the
Special Counsel (Nov. 1, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Hobson Interview].
160 UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION:
ELAINE MII-rLEMAN, 19 (1983). In records obtained under the Privacy Act, Ms. Mittleman learned
that after she gave up seeking her original job and sought a new government position, OSC representative Shigeki Sugiyama had recommended to OPM investigators "not [to] hire the subject to work
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unique.16 1 As a result, information gathered by the Office of the Special
Counsel when whistleblowers ask for help against a reprisal may become
62
the resource to permanently blacklist them from federal employment.1
Tenth, Mr. O'Connor on occasion refused to process complaints
filed on behalf of whistleblowers by private organizations. His excuse
was that organizations such as public interest groups had their own
1 63
agenda and wouldn't look out for the whistleblowers' best interest.
Not only is this paternalism tragical, but it was misplaced, since in congressional testimony 1 64 he repeatedly disclaimed any responsibility for
the whistleblowers' best interest.
Eleventh, in other instances, the Special Counsel has refused to talk
directly with the whistleblower, restricting communications on the case
to the employee's attorney.1 65 Since in practice whistleblowers spend a
great deal more of time on their cases than do their lawyers, this decreases the victim's opportunity to participate in his or her own
defense. 166
Twelfth, in still other instances, the Special Counsel has interfered
with the right to counsel by refusing to let the whistleblower's attorney
in any sensitive position in the United States government." In part, Mr. Sugiyama based this assessment upon "the belief of some Treasury managers that Mittleman had leaked sensitive matters to the
press or through a United States congressman." Further, although Mr. Sugiyama had not met Ms.
Mittleman-he declined her request for an interview to present evidence supporting her reprisal
allegations-he asserted negative conclusions about her personal fitness for government service. Id.
Senator Levin put the Office's approach in perspective: "I am not judging the OSC's decision not to
take Ms. Mittleman's case. But I do know that OSC was not intended to act against federal employees; it was not intended to take employees' requests for help and use that against them." (emphasis in
original) Levin Statement, supra note 141, at 5.
161 Letter from Robert L'Heureux, Associate Special Counsel for Investigation to Thomas Devine (January 7, 1986) ("OPM does at times review OSC files during security background
investigations ... ").
162 1985 Hearings,supra note 2, at 209-37 (testimony of attorneys who represent federal employees). One frustrated whistleblower, James Matthews, took up the Wren, supra note 97, court's suggestion to seek a writ of mandamus for a court order compelling to Special Counsel to act on his
reprisal complaint. Matthews v. O'Connor, Civil Action No. 83-0517, Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 1983). The OSC shortly made the point moot by ruling
against Mr. Matthews. Afterwards, he summarized the lesson to be learned from his experience:
"[rlest assured, if I ever become aware of wrongdoing again I will not bring it to the OSC, and I will
advocate and preach this to others . . . It's almost like they want to find out who are the
whistleblowers and get rid of them." Report of Interview by Ernest Hadley, GAP, of James Matthews and Marilyn M. Thurber (March 8, 1983). This helps to explain why steadily fewer employees
have sought OSC assistance as the Office became more well known. See supra note 130.
163Letter to Honorable John R. Block, Secretary of Agriculture, from K. William O'Connor,
Special Counsel 2 (Feb. 15, 1983).
164 Report of Interview by Ernest Hadley, GAP, of Special Counsel O'Connor (July 14, 1983).
165As a result, one whistleblower had to incur expenses of $20,000 in attorney fees in order to
present her case to the OSC. Hobson Interview, supra note 159.
166

Id.
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participate in a deposition except as an observer.1 67
A few case studies of whistleblowers' experiences with the Office
help to illustrate the above misconduct. Mr. Vincent Laubach was a Department of Interior attorney who challenged the agency's refusal to collect penalties for violations of strip mining laws. Mr. Laubach was later
vindicated by a court decision 168 which concluded that Interior was
"flouting" the nation's strip mining laws, 169 as well as by Congress,
where two Congressional committees supported his charges.1 70 One
committee concluded that the Department of Interior had "failed misera17 1
bly" to enforce the laws.

When he sought assistance from the OSC in 1983, the Special Counsel's investigator did not take any notes in their initial interview, which
cost Mr. Laubach several hundred dollars in attorney fees that as a result
were largely wasted.1 72 Second, the Special Counsel repeatedly accepted
the agency's asserted denials at face value and refused Mr. Laubach's
request to challenge their veracity with polygraph tests, even after Mr.
Laubach, at his own expense, voluntarily took and passed a lie detector
examination on his charges. The assertions in the testimony to the Office
of the Special Counsel also were contradicted by agency testimony at Mr.
Laubach's grievance hearing.

73

Third, the Special Counsel repeatedly refused to meet with Mr. Laubach, who wanted to continue providing more evidence. 174 Fourth, the
OSC responded to a 1982 inquiry from the office of Senator Hatch by
175
issuing instructions to close the case within five days.
Fifth, in the spring of 1985 the Special Counsel reopened the case,
and the investigator from the Office told Mr. Laubach that he definitely
was a whistleblower. A Special Counsel representative told him to come
in for some technical questions to facilitate more effective followup of the
167 See infra note 177.

168 Save Our Cumberland-Mountains, Inc. v. Watt, No. 81-2134 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1982) (order
granting judgment to plaintiffs) (court held that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, 30 USC 1201 et seq., required that the Secretary of the Interior assess and collect mandatory
civil penalties for coal mining operators found in violation of the Act).
169Id. (Dec. 28, 1982) (order denying reconsideration).
170 Breakdowns in the Department of the Interior Civil Penalty and Assessment Program Have
Adversely Affected the Enforcement of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
H.R. Rep. No. 1146, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 House Interior Report];
Office of Surface Mining: Beyond Reclamation?, H.R. Rep. No. 99-206, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
1711984 House Interior Report, supra note 170, at 3.
172Laubach Affidavit, supra note 158, at 1.
173See generally March 11, 1986 letter and enclosures from Thomas Devine to K. William
O'Connor, Special Counsel [hereinafter cited as March 11 letter].
174Laubach Affidavit, supra note 158, at 1-2.
175 Memorandum from K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel, to Lynn Collins, Associate Special Counsel (November 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as O'Connor Memo].
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issues. When Mr. Laubach arrived, however, the OSC investigator told
him that they had checked it again and he was not a whistleblower. Office staffers then interrogated Mr. Laubach, in terms which he characterized as "abusive, hostile, and accusatory," on why he had been publicly
criticizing the Office of the Special Counsel and Mr. O'Connor. Mr.
76
Laubach had appeared on a "20-20" program.'
Sixth, the OSC refused to allow Mr. Laubach's attorney, Mr. Conrad Philos, to participate in the deposition. The Special Counsel investigators would not acknowledge objections from Mr. Philos and instructed
the court reporter not to include his remarks in the record. Mr. Philos
and Mr. Laubach eventually walked out. Mr. Philos is an attorney with
forty-five years experience who is a retired general and former president
of the Federal Personnel Association, as well as a former Chief of Personnel for the U.S. Army. He reported that he had "never encountered a
' 77
more biased procedure to support an obviously predetermined result."'
Seventh, although the Special Counsel knew that Mr. Laubach was
barred by a previous settlement from submitting further evidence in support of the complaint without first being subpoenaed, Mr. O'Connor
failed to issue a subpoena and then again closed the case on the excuse
1 78
that Mr. Laubach had not supplied further evidence.
Eighth, during 1986 the Special Counsel failed to investigate further
after Mr. Laubach submitted a detailed analysis of the previous record to
support charges of false testimony by management witnesses who had
contradicted their OSC denials in sworn testimony at a grievance hearing. Mr. Laubach had specifically requested the Special Counsel not to
investigate for further personnel relief but felt that the agency should be
79
accountable for giving false statements under oath.
Finally, Mr. O'Connor attempted to submit 1986 testimony to the
Civil Service Subcommittee, which, as part of a broad attack on Mr. Laubach's credibility, denied the existence of judicial findings in the public
record where a district court had found Mr. laubach's superiors were
80
"flouting" the strip mining laws, as Mr. Laubach had charged.
Another example involves Mr. Bert Berube, a whistleblower at the
176 Id.; Letter from Conrad Philos to K. William O'Connor 2 (June 23, 1985) [hereinafter cited as
Philos Letter].
177Philos Letter, id. at 2.

171Letter with enclosure from John D. Trezise, Department of Interior, to Louis Clark, GAP;
letter from Alma Hepner, Director, Congressional and Public Relations, Office of the Special Counsel, to Senator Rudy Boschwitz (July 29, 1985).
179 March 11, Letter, supra note 173.
18oCompare supra note 169, with letter from William E. Reukauf, Office of the Special Counsel,
to Thomas Devine (March 10, 1986) at enclosed supplemental testimony of K. William O'Connor 4
(submitted to House Subcommittee on Civil Service (March 10, 1986)). The supplemental testimony
submitted by the Special Counsel was not accepted for the text of the 1986 Hearings,supra note 51.
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General Services Administration who challenged both the Carter and
Reagan Administrations for waste, mismanagement, lack of competitive
bidding, and excessive building code violations. Mr. Berube's charges
involved significant amounts of money and severe occupational health
hazards. 8 1
In recognition of his dissent under the Carter Administration, Mr.
Berube received a $7,500 bonus and was decorated by GSA Administrator Gerald Carmen, who also appointed Mr. Berube to be Regional Administrator of the National Capital Region, the most important region in
the agency.' 8 2 As a Federal Times editorial entitled "Disgrace at GSA"
pointed out, however,
Berube's fatal mistake was taking all this seriously. He actually
tried to solve the problems he was complaining about when he was
on the other side of the fence. Mr. Carmen, who didn't take all
was a threat to GSA's
this so seriously, realized that Mr. Berube
83
way of doing business, and fired him.'
Mr. Berube went to the Special Counsel for assistance. First, the
Special Counsel spent some five hours taking statements from Mr. Berube. 8 4 By contrast, the Special Counsel spent approximately forty minutes on three calls with GSA executives before completing the
investigation of management's side of the story.' 8 5 Senator Levin later
pointed out that the Special Counsel spent over five times as long investi86
gating the complainant as investigating the complaint.'
Second, Mr. O'Connor accepted at face value Administrator Gerald
Carmen's reassurance that the dismissal charges, initially based in part
on Mr. Berube's dissent during an interview with the media, were not
inconsistent with-and did not mean that Mr. Carmen had abandonedhis well-publicized policy of supporting freedom of speech, including
criticisms to the press. As Mr. O'Connor testified in hearings before the
Frank Committee,
For the record, and with no doubt at all, I would tell you I called
Gerry Carmen on the 27th of the month of September and said to
181 These deficiencies were included in a memorandum prepared by Mr. Berube describing fortythree allegedly serious deficiencies at the General Services Administration. GSA Administrator
Gerald Carmen released the critique at a May 25, 1983 press conference. GSA Misdeeds Again
Listed by In House Critic, FEDERAL TIMES, 6 (June 6, 1983); See infra p. 49 & n.267. As Mr.
Berube summarized at the Frank Hearings, "[g]overnment documents and recent studies indicate
that GSA's negligence in maintaining government buildings is resulting in unsafe and hazardous
conditions for almost 1 million federal employees who work in these buildings." Id., at 4.
182The Federal Times, Oct. 31, 1983, at 8, col. - [hereinafter cited as Federal Times Editorial].
183

Id.

184

1983 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 68, at 78 (testimony of Mr. Berube).

185 OSC Case File No. 70-3-00330 Re: Bertrand Berube; Levin Statement, supra note 141, at 4-5.
186

Levin Statement, id., at 5.

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:5

Carmen, 'Just what were you doing with the first amendment?
What is going on there?' I asked him. I had seen the letter of the
23rd which was averred to, and in which Carmen said whatever he
said about the paragraphs of the letter which I understood to be,
he was not making a finding on the letter paragraph which related
to WJLA. And so I asked, 'Just what in the world is this?' He
said the same thing to me that he apparently said to Shaw and
Berube and everybody else, 'Anybody in the agency can say what
' 187
they please. I want that.
That was enough for Mr. O'Connor.
Third, when Mr. O'Connor closed the case, he got the charges
wrong. He stated that the agency was justified in firing Mr. Berube for
88
inadequate performance, when in fact the charge was insubordination.
The Federal Times editorial went on to indicate that the disgrace at
GSA involved the Office of the Special Counsel: "Special Counsel William O'Connor, who has not only refused to help Mr. Berube, openly
supported Carmen in the case."'18 9 In short, by going to the Special
Counsel for assistance Mr. Berube opened the door for Mr. Carmen to
receive zealous reinforcements from the Office of the Special Counsel.
The Special Counsel has testified to the Civil Service Subcommittee
that 22.5 percent of prohibited personnel practice cases received in-depth
investigations. The example of Mr. Joseph Whitson's case, which Mr.
O'Connor would presumably call an in-depth investigation, raises questions about Mr. O'Connor's definitions. 90 Mr. Whitson's case was open
for 13 months at the Office of the Special Counsel, and five investigators
were assigned to it. Mr. Whitson is a civilian employee who was in
charge of quality control for drug testing by urinalysis at an Air Force
base. He believes that he was retaliated against by military personnel.' 9'
Mr. Whitson's dissent is responsible for saving the careers of other Air
Force personnel who had been improperly charged with drug usage.
187 1983 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 68, at 84 (testimony of K. William O'Connor).
188 Mr, O'Connor informed Berube's attorney that "[b]ased on our investigation, I have concluded that the decision to discharge Mr. Berube was made.., because of the conclusion by GSA
officials that Mr. Berube's work performance was inadequate." Letter from K. William O'Connor to
G. Jerry Shaw (Sept. 29, 1983), enclosed in appendix to 1983 House Oversight Hearings, supra note
68, at 157-58. In fact, the proposal to terminate Mr. Berube was taken under the Reform Act's
misconduct provision, 5 U.S.C. 7543, for Senior Executive Service (SES) employees. Proposed Removal Letter from Gerald Carmen to Bertrand Berube 1 (August 26, 1983), enclosed in appendix to
id., at 150. Under the Act, the only option to hold a Senior Executive Service employee accountable
for poor performance is to reassign the employee to a non-SES position. 5 U.S.C. 3592.
I9 Federal Times Editorial, supra note 182.
190 1986 Hearings, supra note 51, at 33 (testimony of K. William O'Connor). In contrast to Mr.
O'Connor's estimate, the GAO found that only eight percent of complaints receive an investigation.
1985 GAO REPORT, supra note 118, at 9.
191 Affidavit of Joseph Whitson (August 2, 1986).
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When he was called to hearings, he provided critical testimony under
oath of how the results of drug testing had been tampered with. 92 Almost immediately after his testimony, Mr. Whitson lost his duties. Instead, he had a desk in a basement with the file cabinets as company, but
no assignments. Sardonically, he reported trying to keep busy by dusting
193
the file drawers from time to time.
Mr. Whitson contacted the Special Counsel. Unfortunately, the
only correspondence from the Special Counsel to Mr. Whitson was a
form letter acknowledging his complaint and another form letter closing
it out.194 Second, after requesting and obtaining voluminous documenta-

tion from Mr. Whitson, the Special Counsel reneged on promises to
speak with his witnesses. 95 The OSC then broke three scheduled appointments to see Mr. Whitson. Last August he decided to come up to
Washington from Texas himself. He called up the Office and made another appointment to speak with an investigator. After he came, however, and sat for an hour and a half, he got a message that the
investigator would not be in that day. Undaunted, Mr. Whitson refused
to leave and insisted on speaking with the investigator's supervisor, who
allowed him in. To his surprise, in a few minutes the investigator appeared and had the interview with him. Unfortunately, she wasn't familiar with any of the facts in the documentation that he had provided
previously to the Special Counsel. Several weeks after this interview, Mr.
196
Whitson received a form letter closing out his case.
B. Corrective action
The Special Counsel's second duty is to seek corrective action restoring the whistleblower to his or her position prior to the reprisal, if the
facts justify it at the conclusion of the OSC investigation. Under 5
U.S.C. 1206(c), the Special Counsel's first step is to recommend to the
head of the agency that the reprisal be neutralized after the Office completes its investigation. If the head of the agency doesn't agree, the OSC
can take the complaint to the Merit Systems Protection Board to seek
enforcement of the recommendations. 197 In practice, this has meant a
full-blown adjudicatory hearing, although the legislative intent was to
provide streamlined, expeditious help, and the statute only provides "opportunity for comment" by the agency and the Office of Personnel Man192 Id.
193 Id.
194

Id.

195 Id.
196 Id.

197 5 U.S.C. 1206(c)(1)(B).
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agement. 98 Here the structure was for the Merit Systems Protection
Board, through its review of disputes between the Special Counsel on
behalf of whistleblowers and the agency, to ensure that the merit system
principle of protecting constructive dissent is achieved. 99
To explain why there has been no litigation under the Act's primary
intended remedy for the last six years, one must consider first that Mr.
O'Connor denied any responsibility for correcting individual wrongs. He
explained that his client was the merit system, and that he had no duty to
help individuals. His perspective on the Office's prosecutorial discretion
was that the victims of retaliation are no more than "observers," "bystanders," and "witnesses. ' ' 2°° However, "merit system" is an empty
phrase without human beings, and the individual employee is the party
directly injured by a prohibited personnel practice.
Another explanation for the lack of results is Mr. O'Connor's apparent unwillingness to take any risk of losing a case. In 1985 the OSC
informed the GAO that the Office would litigate on behalf of
whistleblowers only if there were a seventy-five to eighty percent chance
of winning. 20 1 If that weren't bad enough, in the latest annual report the
standard for whistleblowers and other employees to meet before the Special Counsel will help them get their jobs back has become even more
unrealistic: there must be a "virtual certainty that the evidence provides
sufficient facts to ensure success .... ",202
The third explanation is that Mr. O'Connor and his predecessor,
Mr. Kozinski, have gutted the law-both the first amendment and the
198Id. As a result, in order to obtain relief the aggrieved employee must win twice. Support from
the Special Counsel only qualifies the reprisal victim for a full-blown evidentiary hearing to neutralize the alleged prohibited personnel practice, unless the agency complies with the Special Counsel's
corrective action recommendations. 5 U.S.C. 1206(c)(1)(A). The structure also creates a double
standard between the ability of agencies and employees to hold the Special Counsel accountable.
While the employee has no right of administrative or judicial review of OSC decisions to close or not

even investigate a case, supra nn. 95-106, the agency dissatisfied with OSC findings can ignore the
recommendations and defend its position at an evidentiary hearing.
199 Id.
200 1985 Hearings,supra note 2, at 238-59 and supra p. 28 & n.40. Mr. O'Connor left no grounds
for confusion about his position as he testified, "OSC is not a Federal Ann Landers. There may be
those who wish for one. OSC is not an ombudsman. There may be some who wish for one. But the
Congress did not enact such a law." Id. at 238. Curiously, even Mr. O'Connor's predecessor Alex
Kozinski-highly criticized for taking an overly pro-management stance-took an inconsistent view.
At September 22, 1981 oversight hearings, Representative Schroeder queried, "Why did you take the
job of Special Counsel? What do you see as the mission of the office?" Mr. Kozinski responded, "I
accepted the job of Special Counsel because I believe that I can use my talents and abilities to finally
make this office the effective, responsible ombudsman that Congress intended it to be." Letter from
Alex Kozinski to Patricia Schroeder 10 (October 28, 1981).
201 1985 GAO REPORT, supra note 118, at 17.

202 1985 OSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 2.
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whistleblower protection provisions of the Reform Act. Eleven examples
illustrate their methods.
First, in some instances the Special Counsel has indicated that a
whistleblower is not protected unless he or she is the first to expose a
problem or to challenge misconduct. It doesn't matter that the
whistleblower is the first to effectively raised the issue, or to get results in
20 3
correcting a problem.
Second, the Special Counsel questions whether there is protected
' '2 4
speech if the disclosure is not to the "responsible agency official. 0
"Casual" dissent, presumably to a coworker, has the same uncertain status. 20 5 This qualifier directly contradicts the Special Counsel's own regulations, which provide, "[a] protected disclosure may be oral or written
'20 6
and to any person within or outside the agency.
Third, the Office has classified dissent outside the scope of one's offi20 7
cial job duties as "personal," and therefore unprotected.
Fourth, the Special Counsel has eliminated first amendment protection for employees who are "suspected of" communicating with the
20 8
press or Congress.
Fifth, the Special Counsel has testified that preparation of reports
taking positions contrary to agency policy is insubordination and there20 9
fore unprotected.
Sixth, the Special Counsel, during Mr. Kozinski's tenure, ruled that
dissent phrased as a request for assistance was not criticism, and there210
fore was unprotected by the first amendment.
Seventh, under both Mr. Kozinski and Mr. O'Connor, the Special
203 See, e.g., Letter from Lynn Collins, Office of the Special Counsel, to Edward Passman, counsel
for Vincent Laubach, OSC Case No. 10-2-00383 (February 25, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Laubach
Closeout] (the letter indicated that Mr. Laubach was not considered to be a whistleblower by OSC
because the information he disclosed was previously discussed in government reports).
204 1985 GAO REPORT, supra note 118, at 22.
205 Id. at 22-23.
206 5 C.F.R. 1250.3(c).
207 Letter from Shigeki Sugiyama, Office of the Special Counsel, to Jay Thai (June 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Thai Closeout].
208 See supra note 160.
209 As Mr. O'Connor testified at hearings on Mr. Berube's termination to explain the OSC conclusion that dismissal was justified,
[w]hat we see is the Administrator of GSA setting policy north and Berube steaming
south, and the report that Berube produces is indeed one which does play havoc with
the undertaking of a 6-percent [budget] reduction, which is the direction of their Administrator of GSA to the entire staff. It does say things that cannot be done, according to the report, with the resources available. It does not say that we can do this and
we will get the job done.
1983 House Oversight Hearings.supra note 68, at 96.
. 210 Thai Closeout, supra note 207, at 2; letter from Shigeki K. Sugiyama, Office of the Special
Counsel, to Jay Thai (Aug. 16, 1982). Compare with supra nn.63-4.
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Counsel repeatedly has failed to act against gag orders, although Mr.
Kozinski on occasion recognized that they represent one of the most basic violations of first amendment rights .211
Eighth, in the case of Dr. Jeffrey Kassel, an employee of the Veterans Administration 2 12 the Special Counsel ruled he was unprotected by
the first amendment when a newspaper misquoted his speech. This
means that the first amendment doesn't protect whistleblowers for dissent that mistakenly was attributed to them. From the OSC perspective,
if an employee starts to dissent at all, he or she can be subjected to personnel actions for circumstances beyond his or her control-what the
213
employee didn't say-and the Constitution won't apply.
Ninth, the Office of the Special Counsel has failed to consider constructive knowledge as a factor in examining whistleblower charges.
Constructive knowledge means that an official should have known about
the employee's dissent, even if the manager were not personally aware of
it.214 Congress inserted this section into the Reform Act so that federal
managers could not hide behind hatchet men who would do the dirty
work of targeting dissenters for personnel actions, allowing the original
managers to claim the actions could not be retaliatory because they were
2 15
ignorant of the whistleblowing.
211 Confirmation Hearings, supra note 135, at 92. Any system of prior restraint of expression
bears heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, and the government carries a heavy burden of showing justification for imposition of such a restraint. U.S. v. Washington Post Co., 403
U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). Neither the
February 25, 1983 closeout of Mr. Laubach's allegations, Laubach Closeout, supra note 203, nor the
June 8, 1982 closeout of Mr. Thai's complaint, Thai Closeout, supra note 207, discussed their allegations of gag orders. Although in its August 16, 1982 letter to Thai, the OSC promised to reconsider
the constitutionality of the gag order, the Office failed to communicate further on the issue.
212 Letter from Leonard Dribinsky, Assistant Special Counsel for Prosecution, to Dr. Jeffrey
Kassel (August 7, 1985).
213 Id. Even though Dr. Kassel's original statement was misquoted by the press, causing
problems in his workplace, the OSC upheld a reassignment of Kassel. The OSC relied on the language of Pickering which points to disruption of "discipline and harmony in the workplace" as a
balancing factor and found that although Kassel's original statement did not cause any problems, the
paper's misquote did and as such the reassignment was proper.
214 "Constructive knowledge" has been defined as "that knowledge which one has the opportunity, by exercise of ordinary care, to possess." Attoe v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 153
N.W.2d 575, 579, 36 Wis. 2d 539 (1967); "knowledge or notice of circumstances which would put a
prudent man upon inquiry as to the fact in question." Hayward Lumber and Investment Co. v.
Orondo Mines, 94 P.2d 380, 383, 34 Cal. App. 2d 697 (1939); and "the knowledge which is gathered
from all the facts and circumstances of each particular case, as well as from well established inferences or presumptions in law." Brown v. Green, 42 A. 991, 993, 17 Del. 535 (1899).
215 As the Leahy Report explained, "It is currently too easy for a serious problem to be excused
within the bureaucracy because the 'right' people were not aware that it existed." Leahy Report,
supra note 32, at 3. The legislative history emphasized that delegation of personnel decisionmaking
authority "will not, however, relieve the head of the executive agency or other top officials for ultimate responsibility for personnel actions and policies within the agency, to the extent that such
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Tenth, the Special Counsel foreshadowed the MSPB's decision by
over two years 216 in drastically expanding the Supreme Court's decision
in Mt. Healthy v. Doyle21 7-where the Court held that whistleblowers
will not get their jobs back in cases where agencies would have successfully fired them anyway on grounds independent of dissent-as a bar to
relief for whistleblowers. Under that test, whistleblowing cannot be a
smokescreen to obstruct personnel actions that had already been
planned. At the Frank hearings on Mr. Berube, however, at least for the
purpose of considering stay requests the Special Counsel transformed
this reasonable standard into the following test: whether the agency
could have made a rationalcase. 218 Under this approach, retaliation for
dissent is acceptable as long as any reasonable independent basis can be
2 19
drummed up after the fact.
Finally, Mr. O'Connor imposed settlements on whistleblowers with220
out their consent, or even, in some cases, without their knowledge.
For example, whistleblower William Tuesburg of HUD characterized the
22
Special Counsel's "success" in his case as a further reprisal. 1
officials have knowledge or should have knowledge of the actions taken or policies implemented."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 40, at 23 (emphasis added).
216 See supra n.117.
217 Supra note 65.
218 Although Mr. O'Connor presented inconsistent testimony at various congressional forums on
how to translate Mt. Healthy, at the Frank Hearings he justified his decision to reject Mr. Berube's
complaint as follows:
I am convinced he spent enough time doing things other than what he was asked to do
to make GSA able to make a rational allegation and a rational case that his performance was not adequate. That is the kind of issue I have to deal with, not whether they
are right or wrong, but whether their case is rational. Whether they have under the Mt.
Healthy test an affirmative defense. They sure do. Whether it is absolute or not, that is
not the question.
1983 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 68, at 95. Later in the hearing, the following exchange
between Mr. O'Connor and Congressman Frank further explained the context for the former's Mr.
Healthy analysis.
MR. O'CONNOR: . . . For purposes of making a stay decision all I need to do is see
whether it is sufficient as presented to be arguably within the bounds.
MR. FRANK: ...You are saying as you read it if the agency can make out a plausible
case that it had an independent ground, that keeps you from staying even if there was
an impermissable motive?
MR. O'CONNOR: That is how I think Mt. Healthy works.
Id. at 100.
219 See supra nn.115-17.
220 As Mr. O'Connor defended one controversial settlement: "We settled our case. His case is
something else." 1985 Hearings,supra note 2, at 258 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, each of the
two "cases" involves the same reprisal victim, and in many instances the victim has no independent
right to present "his" case. See supra nn. 102-05. Under Mr. O'Connor's disclaimer of any relationship with the victim beyond his or her status as a witness, this leaves the aggrieved employee without
any remedy.
221 Letter from Ross A. Friedman, Counsel to Mr. Tuesburg, to Gordon Walker, HUD (June 17,
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Mr. O'Connor was not satisfied merely to consistently rule against
whistleblowers, or to gut the first amendment. He extended his hostility
to whistleblowing through gratuitous personal attacks on the employees
who came to him for help. In numerous cases, the Office of the Special
Counsel trotted out stale charges of misconduct that had been previously
discredited, in order to attack the motives of whistleblowers raising pol222
icy challenges.
As mentioned earlier, recent Special Counsels have countered these
criticisms by claiming vindication from the results. 223 At February 1986
congressional hearings, Mr. O'Connor asserted that the would-be
whistleblowers he has turned away have lost their cases everywhere else
they sought assistance as well. 224 That claim is patently false.
For example, Mr. O'Connor attacked Vincent Laubach, the Department of Interior whistleblower, as an employee who had lost his case and
therefore did not have much credibility. 225 In fact, Mr. O'Connor was
referring to a recommended decision in the Laubach administrative
grievance. 226 The final results of the case were that Mr. Laubach won
227
reinstatement, full back pay, and $24,000 in compensatory damages.
This is in addition to the vindication he received from Congressional
228
committees and court, confirming the substance of his dissent.
Mr. Eduardo Delgado is a USDA meat inspector who in 1985 blew
the whistle to his supervisors, to the press, and to Congress in testimony
before the House Civil Service Subcommittee about public health
1983). Mr. Tuesburg has since testified that the Special Counsel also failed to enforce the constructive elements of the settlement. 1985 Hearings,supra note 2, at 207.
222For example, in response to Mr. John Coplin's whistleblowing disclosure about harassment of
dissenting meat graders and other misconduct such as widespread bribery in the Department of
Agriculture, Mr. O'Connor in part declined to order an investigation of alleged consumer fraud and
public health hazards on the following gratuitous excuse: "It appears that some statements which
Mr. Coplin made in travel vouchers during his employment were found to be untrue, although no
prosecution ensued." Letter from K. William O'Connor to John Block (February 15, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Coplin Closeout]. Mr. O'Connor's attack, even if it were correct, was irrelevant to
charges of illegality, mismanagement, abuse of authority and substantial and specific danger to public health and safety with respect to USDA meat grading and inspection standards. In fact, however,
no prosecution had ever occurred because Mr. Coplin incurred the expenses while working undercover for the Inspector General to catch instances where diseased cattle had been approved for
human consumption. The Special Counsel's approach to the Coplin disclosure was particularly revealing. Mr. Coplin's integrity, dedication, and retaliatory punishment were so clear-cut that he was
one of the case studies in the Leahy Report, supra note 32, to justify creating the Office of the Special
Counsel as an agent to protect whistleblowers and order investigations into their dissent. Leahy
Report, supra note 32 at G99-128.
22-1See supra note 142.

2241986 Hearings,supra note 51, at 16 (testimony of Mr. O'Connor).
225 1986 Hearings,supra note 51, at 10.
226Grievance of Vincent Laubach, U.S. Department of Labor, PG 83-22 (July 2, 1984).
227 See supra note 180.
228 See supra nn.168-71 and 180.
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hazards from unsanitary conditions in meat and poultry slaughtering
plants. 229 Mr. Delgado's charges led to the shutdown of several facilities
230
and were confirmed by USDA investigations.
Mr. Delgado made a complaint to the Office of the Special Counsel
to challenge a five-day suspension, which he alleged was intended as a
warning to him and all other area inspectors to stop speaking out on the
problem of contaminated meat and poultry in Southern California. 231 In
May 1985, the Special Counsel declined to seek a stay because, as an
OSC attorney explained informally, Mr. Delgado presented too much evidence in his initial interview for the Office to follow through on the facts
and get management's side of the story in the Board's limited time frame
for injunctive relief.232 The Special Counsel promised to open a long229 1985 Hearings, supra note 2, at 121-37. As Mr. Delgado described:
In the poultry, some examples included the sanitation deficiencies such as feathers,
pieces of fat and pieces of decaying product on equipment that was left for days and
was allowed to be used without proper sanitation; chicken fat used for flavoring which
was contaminated by intestines dragging in their water trough that was used to flush
away the condemned product, fecal material, people spitting in this trough, throwing
their chewing gum in it, blowing their noses and throwing the tissues inside the trough.
They were washing their hands in the trough, handling the product; chickens falling in
the water. They would rehang them back to be used.
The thing that was completely unacceptable to any human being was some of the
toilets were overflowing onto the floor, completely covering everything in front of you
with-there were actually chunks of human sewage coming out onto the floor...
Id., 121.
There were overscalded chickens which are cooked-and they get cooked with hot
water while their guts are still inside. There are feathers that we can't spot. Cadavers.
The line is moving so fast, you don't have the time to inspect them. We have told them
this time and time and time again and nothing is done about it. In fact, they are thinking about increasing the line even faster.
Stagnant water was left in sumps which are about the size of half a swimming pool
and the water was left over the weekend. The sump would stink up the whole plant and
we would have to let the water run for awhile before we even started production.
There were pet food containers. They were allowed to ship edible products inside
of them. These pet food containers were also used to ship these carcasses that were
ground up, including the intestines, the fecal material, feathers, dirt, you name it.
Also, some of these carcasses were not allowed to be drained properly, which
meant that the taxpayers were paying for water on the carcasses.
The thing that really bugged me about this was that we realized that this product
was being used for the school lunch program, for one of the largest known soup companies and also for baby food.
Id., 121-22.
230 Carlton, Closeup: Meatpacking, The Orange County Register, J2 (Dec. 8, 1985); UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION:

FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE INSPECTION PRO-

IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, FILE No. SF-2499-7 (Nov. 13,
REFERENCED THEREIN [hereinafter referred to as USDA OIG REPORT].
GRAM

231Affidavit of Eduardo Delgado 2, 21-2 (May 2, 1985).
232 1985 Hearings, supra note 2, at 320-24.
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term investigation, however. The Office conducted its probe for seven
months, during which the Special Counsel failed to communicate with
most of Mr. Delgado's witnesses. In the end, the OSC sent a brief form
233
letter to Mr. Delgado, saying the Office had not found any retaliation.
Luckily for Mr. Delgado, he had also charged that the suspension
was an instance of racial discrimination and had brought his case to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as well. In contrast to the Special Counsel's investigation, the EEOC did an outstanding
job. The EEOC investigator interviewed all eight witnesses suggested by
Mr. Delgado, and forwarded a full report with all of the relevant documents and witness interviews for both sides to both parties. 23 4 It was
such a strong investigation that the agency settled the charges by with235
drawing the suspension, and Mr. Delgado won.
Significantly, the agency official who withdrew the charges said he
did not think there had been any racial discrimination, but he did think
there might have been retaliation for Mr. Delgado's protest of problems
on the chicken slaughter line. 236 In other words, the Special Counsel's
view of reprisal was more narrow than that of the agency officials for
whom Mr. Delgado worked. Mr. Delgado won a complete victory in this
case, but it was in spite of the Special Counsel's rejection.
Still another example of an employee who won after being turned
down by the Special Counsel involves the case of Wallace Weiss. Mr.
Weiss challenged anti-Semitic discrimination at a federal agency and was
turned down by the Special Counsel when he requested assistance in
fighting it. He took the case to district court and won a significant precedent. 237 At that point the Special Counsel filed a disciplinary complaint,
238
which the Office is pursuing successfully.
Certainly the Weiss example raises questions about the accuracy of
Mr. O'Connor's conclusions that there haven't been any worthy victims
233

The Special Counsel explained its basis for closing the case as follows:

Our investigation disclosed that the agency had a reasonable basis to conclude that you
had committed the above infraction. The evidence was insufficient to show that reprisal or discrimination were the motives behind your suspension. Therefore, we plan no
further prosecution of this matter and are closing the file without further action.
Letter from William Reukauf, Office of the Special Counsel, to Eduardo Delgado (January 27, 1986)
[hereinafter cited as Delgado Closeout].
234 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL, EMPLOYEE APEDUARDO DELGADO, Case No. 85030, Contractor
Delaney, Siegel, Zorn and Associates (January 8, 1986) [hereinafter cited as EEO REPORT].
235 EEO REPORT. Id., Exhibit 9, at 9.
PEALS STAFF, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION:

236

Id.

1985 Hearings,supra note 2, at 231 (testimony of Bridget Mugane on initial OSC response);
Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va. 1984).
238 Special Counsel v. Zimmerman, M.S.P.B. No. HQ12068510015 (rec. dec. Feb. 13, 1986).
237
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to help. Indeed, the significance of this example could be extended to at
least some of the thirty-one disciplinary complaints which Mr. O'Connor
boasts to have successfully prosecuted during his term. 239 Surely the

OSC could have helped the victims of illegal retaliation in some of those
instances.
C. Stays
The Special Counsel's third function is to petition for administrative
4
injunctions or stays. That authority is provided under 5 U.S.C. 1208.2 0
This section allows the Special Counsel to effectively counter agency attempts at faits accomplis, in which the whistleblower is out on the street
and frequently without income when he or she tries to prepare a defense
in the disciplinary action. The legislative history emphasized that the
Merit Systems Protection Board should give great deference to judgments of the Office of the Special Counsel. 24 1 This is one area where the
Special Counsel, in effect, is the primary decisionmaker, with Board
oversight.
Under the early Special Counsels, whom Mr. O'Connor criticized as
"Keystone Cops, ' 2 4 2 administrative injunctions and stays were used
quite extensively and effectively. But from his confirmation through
1985, Mr. O'Connor filed fewer stay requests (17) than did the OSC for
1980 alone (20).243 The 1984 annual report lists four stay requests involving two cases. 244 The 1985 annual report does not mention any requests for stays. 24 5 The most significant authority for the Special
Counsel is dormant.
The techniques to circumvent the Reform Act's intent again were
deceptively simple. The Office introduced a policy not to seek stays or
239 1986 Hearings, supra note 51, at 4.
240 Under 5 U.S.C. 1208(a) the Special Counsel can obtain a stay order for 15 days from any
Board member. Under section 1208(b), any Board member can extend the stay for thirty days.
Under section 1208(c), the entire Board can act to extend the stay for "any period which the Board
considers appropriate."
241 SENATE REPORT, supra note 40, at 29; Maroldo, MS.P.B. Review of Stay Requests Under 5

US.C. 1208, 82 F.M.S.R., v-I1 through v-15 (April 1982). Consistent with this guidance, the MSPB
has adopted a sliding scale for progressive stay requests that provides relief under section 1208(a)
whenever there is a "rational basis," and even under section 1208(c) interprets the facts in the light
most favorable to relief. Special Counsel v. Dept. H.U.D., 15 M.S.P.R. 315 (1983); Special Counsel
v. Dept. of Energy, 13 M.S.P.B. 32, 14 M.S.P.R. 333 (1983); Matter ofMunoz, 2 M.S.P.B. 475, 2
M.S.P.R. 311 (1980); matter ofPitchford, 2 M.S.P.B. 500, 2 M.S.P.R. 337 (1980); Matter of Kass,
supra note 93; Wells v. Califano, I M.S.P.B. 73, 1 M.S.P.R. 76 (1979); Matter of Frazier, 1 M.S.P.B.
64, 1 M.S.P.R. 66 (1979).
2421986 Hearings, supra note 51, at 4.
243 1980 OSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra n.122. See also supra p. 25 & nn.122-24.
24 1984 OSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 15.
245 1985 OSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 123.
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injunctive relief until a personnel action is formally proposed, and not to
seek a stay after the personnel action has taken effect. 246 That only
leaves the relatively brief period while the action is pending to seek injunctive relief. In light of the long delays to receive assistance from the
Office of the Special Counsel, as a practical matter, the policy makes it
impossible to obtain injunctive relief.
A second reason is that on occasion the Special Counsel has explained to whistleblowers that a formal stay was not necessary because it
had been negotiated informally. 24 7 Unfortunately, when agencies have
reneged on their agreement not to take a personnel action pending OSC
investigative results, as with Mr. Laubach, the Special Counsel has not
backed up the whistleblower, who is left out of work and without
income.

24 8

The OSC's decision to let the stay protections of the Civil Service
Reform Act dry up has represented a significant loss of whistleblower
rights. To have to prepare a defense after being forced out of the office
weakens an employee's capacity to fight back. Access to information is
reduced, and the flow of witnesses dries up because the whistleblower's
plight has been made an example for all others. At the same time, the
employee may be without income, struggling to cope with increasing financial pressure.
D. Disciplinaryprosecutions
The Special Counsel's fourth duty is to file disciplinary complaints
in appropriate circumstances, listed earlier. 249 This function provides
personal accountability for those who engage in illegal personnel actions.
After all, if there is no possibility of a disciplinary action, a repressive
federal manager has nothing to lose by engaging in illegal retaliation. At
°
worst, he or she will not get away with it.25
This is the function that Mr. O'Connor most actively attempted to
develop. For example, he largely replaced the investigators who were
personnel specialists with criminal investigators. 25t It is difficult to conclude that these are victories for the merit system, however, without a
careful analysis of whom Mr. O'Connor prosecuted, and why.
246 Confirmation Hearings, supra note 135, at 120.

247 Laubach Affidavit, supra note 158.
248 Id.

249 See supra note 81.
250 Ironically, the practical impact of adding the option for limited disciplinary sanctions at the
administrative level may have been to reduce deterrence by eliminating the traditional sanction that
citizens generally use to deter abuses of power by federal officials-liability for constitutional torts.
See infra nn.329-57.
251 1985 Hearings,supra note 2, at 240-41 (testimony of Mr. O'Connor).
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For example, initially one of the Special Counsel's most celebrated
victories was the Starrett case, 252 in which the head of the Defense Contract Audit Agency was forced out of federal service for retaliating
against auditor George Spanton. But whistleblower Ernest Fitzgerald,
who lobbied the Special Counsel to conduct the prosecution, testified that
it was concluded prematurely. Mr. Fitzgerald analogized the end of the
case to the factfinding level at which the U.S. Attorney wanted to leave
25 3
the Watergate investigation after the Watergate 7 had been convicted.
Would it truly have been considered effective prosecution if the Watergate case's most significant target had been Gordon Liddy instead of
President Nixon? If Mr. Fitzgerald is correct, the Special Counsel's disciplinary prosecution in the Spanton case may have been a way to contain
a scandal, instead of going to the source to hold the decisionmakers
accountable.
Mr. O'Connor testified that he concentrated on prosecutions because that is the most effective way to deter misconduct. 254 Based on the
targets the Special Counsel has selected for Hatch Act prosecutions,
there is a legitimate question what type of activities the OSC has sought
to discourage. For example, currently the Office is using scarce resources
to prosecute four federal employee union presidents for technical violations of the Hatch Act through their alleged campaigning for Mr.
Mondale during the previous election. 255 The prosecutions raised questions of partisan bias because the union leaders were on leave from active
duty and openly engaging in behavior that traditionally has been consid25 6
ered acceptable by previous administrations of both parties.
An earlier Hatch Act prosecution litigated by Mr. O'Connor and
filed by Mr. Kozinski raised even more severe questions about the objectivity of their judgment. 257 The case involved Guadalupe Saldana, an
EPA employee and president of a national Hispanic organization. The
Special Counsel charged that Saldana had violated the Hatch Act by
meeting with President Carter in Saldana's official capacity as the Hispanic organization's chairman, and then endorsing Carter for reelection. 258 The case went before an Administrative Law Judge and the
outcome was disastrous for the Special Counsel. The ALJ granted Sal252 Special Counsel v. Starrett, 28 M.S.P.R. 60 (1985), rev'in Starrett v. Special Counsel, No. 851694, slip op. (4th Cir. June 5, 1986).
253 1985 Hearings,supra note 2, at 264-65 (testimony of Ernest Fitzgerald).
254 Id., at 248 (testimony of Mr. O'Connor).
255 Special Counsel v. Morris Biller, Kenneth T. Blaylock, Vincent R. Sombrotto, M.S.P.B. (com-

plaint filed Feb. 26, 1985).
256 Marlow, Union Leaders Charged with Hatch Act Violations, FED. TIMES 16 (Mar. il,

257 Special Counsel v. Saldana, 20 M.S.P.R. 308 (1984).
258

Id.

(1985).
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dana's motion to dismiss after the Special Counsel had presented the
prosecution's case, without waiting for evidence from the defense. During the prosecution's case, the OSC's only witness testified against the
prosecution charges. The ALJ concluded that the "charge was clearly
without merit" and second, Mr. Saldana was "totally innocent ...this is
not a failure to produce a preponderance of the evidence. The failure is
to produce any evidence.

'259

The ALJ was so concerned that he ordered

the Special Counsel to pay Saldana's attorney fees and other costs of the
government's prosecution. 260 The Merit Systems Protection Board
found this unprecedented remedy inappropriate 26 I and was upheld by the
federal circuit.

262

The disciplinary complaint against Mr. Gordon Harvey raises even
more troubling questions about what type of conduct the Special Counsel
is trying to deter. Mr. Harvey was a veteran investigator at the Federal
Energy Administration who participated in substantially advancing the
investigation that later led to the discovery of significant overcharges by
an oil company owned by Joseph Wright and his father. 263 Mr. Wright
was chairman of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, the
coordinating committee for the Special Counsel and all the inspectors
general in the federal government. 264 Mr. Harvey moved to another job,

but shortly after the oil overcharge case began to heat up, the Special
Counsel filed a complaint against Mr. Harvey for alleged whistleblower
retaliation and retaliation against an employee who attempted to exercise
appeal rights. 265 Mr. Harvey alleged that Mr. O'Connor conferred with
259

Id.

260 Id.
261 Id.

262 Saldana v. M.S.P.B., No. 84-1373 (Fed. Cir. June 28, 1985).
263 In January 1981, Harvey identified Canal Refining Company as a potential violator in the
entitlements area and wrote Canal of the intention to "intensify its audit efforts." Hearing on Oil
Overcharge Enforcement Before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigationsof the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 1985 Overcharge Hearings] (Subcommittee Chronology of matters regarding Canal Refining). Joseph Wright,
Jr. was identified as the executive vice president of Anchor as well as a director of the corporation
and a major shareholder. Wright's father was the president of the corporation and a director.
Wright, his father, and his sisters had major financial ties to both Anchor and Canal. Id.at 515-28.
By 1983, proposed Remedial Orders were issued against Anchor for $16 million in pricing violations, id. at 79-174, and against Canal for $23 million. Id. at 515-28.
264 Integrity and Efficiency in Federal Programs, Exec. Order No. 12,301, 46 Fed. Reg. 19, 2111
(1981). (The creation and operation of the Council shall not interfere with existing lines of authority
and responsibility in the departments and agencies.)
265 Although OSC had closed the Harvey investigation at the request of the complaining employee in September 1982, it reopened the case in January 1983. Settlement negotiations between the
government and Anchor which began in September 1982 had reached an impasse by January 1983,
with Anchor offering $500,000 for settlement of the government's $16 million claim. 1985 OverchargeHearings, supra note 263, at 46-7, 182-84. The OSC charged Harvey with retaliating against
the employee for his testimony to Congress concerning certain improprieties in audits conducted by
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Mr. Wright around the time of filing the complaint, and that Mr. Wright
called Mr. Harvey's supervisor in an effort to persuade Mr. Harvey not
266
to fight the charges.

A comparison of Mr. O'Connor's handling of the Berube case with
the Harvey prosecution reveals almost identical conduct by the alleged
whistleblowers, but diametrically opposite responses by the Office of the
Special Counsel, in a manner that is equally inconsistent with merit system principles. First, it is necessary to consider the alleged protected
activity in each case. What was the stake for the public in Berube's
whistleblowing, compared with the employee's dissent at the Department
of Energy? Mr. Berube was challenging asbestos and other health
hazards to federal workers, as well as the possible unrealiability of the
White House power supply, owing to building code and electrical violations. The abuses were so severe that Mr. Berube charged in some cases
the federal buildings would be condemned if a private landlord owned
them. 267 The Energy Department employee, on the other hand, was
complaining about conflicts of interest connected with communications
to Congress. 268 Although both topics were eligible for protection, certainly Mr. Berube's dissent was at least as valuable to the public as in the
Harvey case.
Second, what were the acts of alleged protected activity and prohibited personnel practices in each case? Mr. Berube was blowing the whistle and threatening to exercise appeal rights if the agency did not correct
the IG's office. The OSC also charged Harvey with retaliating against the employee for attempting
to exercise his appeal rights to the OSC. Special Counsel v. Gordon Harvey, No. HQ12068310021
(complaint filed August 24, 1983).
266 OSC v. Gordon Harvey, Transcript before M.S.P.B. [hereinafter cited as Harvey M.S.P.B.
Transcript]. On June 16, 1983, Special Counsel O'Connor called Joseph Wright as Chairman of
PCIE and asked him to intercede in the Department of Energy in pursuit of a plea bargaining
arrangement with Harvey. Harvey's lawyers then contended that Wright then unsuccessfully attempted to influence Harvey's supervisor to persuade Harvey to accept a minor disciplinary letter in
exchange for the OSC's termination of the charges. Id., at 141-43.
267 In an interview on station WJLA on July 11, 1983, Berube stated, "[m]any of our buildings
are deteriorating to the point where they've become almost uninhabitable. As a matter of fact, many
of them would be condemned if they were put to the test of the local codes." The statements were
originally included in a presentation by Berube to his superiors on January 21, 1983, and first made
public in a GSA press conference on May 19, 1983. Berube's conclusions were based on his findings
of inadequate or nonexistent sprinkler and fire alarm systems, deficient exits and elevators, OSHA
environmental and safety violations, and structural deficiencies in 1,657 GSA buildings; a total of
9,300 deficiencies affecting over one million federal employees. Berube reiterated his findings in
testimony to Congress. 1983 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 68, at 4, and supra pp. 34-5 &
n.181.
268 The employee charged that he was being retaliated against for exposing instances of abuse of
authority by the former acting Inspector General to a Congressional Committee, and for opposing
the proposed nomination of the DOE controller to the position of Deputy IG, because the nominee
would be supervising projects as an IG that he had previously been responsible for carrying out.
Harvey M.S.P.B. Transcript, supra note 266 at 122-23.
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the problems and stop the retaliation. 26 9 In the Harvey case, the aggrieved employee was threatening to blow the whistle and exercise appeal
rights to the Office of the Special Counsel if a threatened personnel action
were not rescinded. 270 In Mr. Berube's case, the communications involved the media. Otherwise, however, the protected conduct appears to
be very similar.
What were the differences between the two cases? In Mr. Berube's
case, the bulk of the whistleblowing was before the challenged personnel
action-before the alleged reprisal. 27 1 In the Harvey case, however, the
employee threatened to go to the Special Counsel after a personnel action
had been proposed. 272 That is a very significant distinction among the
legal factors to probe in evaluating charges of retaliatory intent.273 There
were, of course, examples of dissent in the history of both individuals, but
for the issues that the Special Counsel later emphasized at the hearing
the protected activity was primarily after the threatened personnel
action.
Fourth, it is necessary to compare the management responses in the
Berube and Harvey cases. With Berube, GSA Administrator Gerald
Carmen formally proposed the termination, in part for going to the press.
That reason was formally listed in the charges. Although this charge was
later rescinded, the initial proposal was quite clear that public dissent
was a very significant factor in Mr. Carmen's mind when he made the
decision to fire Mr. Berube. 274 In the Harvey case, by contrast, Mr. Harvey denied that his personnel action was due to the employee's protected
269 Berube chose to present his findings to his superiors at GSA first. It was the GSA who first
revealed the contents of Berube's findings to the public during a press conference, effectively blowing
the whistle on themselves. 1983 House Oversight Hearings,supra note 68, at 72-73.
270 In October 1981, Harvey suggested the termination of the employee. Only then did the employee submit a draft letter of appeal to Harvey's supervisor, threatening to forward the appeal
unless he was promised that he would not be fired. Harvey M.S.P.E. Transcript, supra note 266 at
120-21.
271 Berube had been attempting to actively pursue a solution to the problems he identified and to
address the issues of the whistleblowing for several months before the termination. See generally,
1983 House Oversight Hearings,supra note 68 (statement of Bertrand Berube, 2-5, and testimony, 6681).
272 See note 270.
273 See, Special Counsel v. Starrett, 28 M.S.P.R. 60, 70 n.7 (1985) (Employees cannot immunize
themselves from agency actions merely by donning the clothes of a whistleblower.) See also SENATE
REPORT, supra note 40, at 8: "nor would the bill protect employees who claim to be whistleblowers
in order to avoid [an] adverse action..." See also supra note 69.
274 1983 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 68, at 68-73. In a meeting with Berube and his
attorney, Berube's supervisor stated, "[a]nyone in this agency can go to the press at any time if they
so choose or say anything to anybody they want. This is a wide open agency. We don't have any
secrets to hide." Ironically, the termination later given Mr. Berube listed as one of its points for the
dismissal Berube's statements to the press: "Making such a statement on a television interview without any qualification or explanation is a particularly egregious example of your reckless, intemperate, and irresponsible conduct that is disruptive in its impact on the confidence of the public in the
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activity. Mr. Harvey admitted that he was upset, but said that in fact he
had decided to take the personnel action on alternate grounds before the
aggrieved employee threatened to go to the Office of the Special
Counsel.

27 5

Fifth, there are significant inconsistencies in the Special Counsel's
interpretation of the law. The two cases are almost twins in terms of the
legal issues, if not the specific facts. In the Berube case, however, Mr.
O'Connor characterized Mr. Berube's threat to exercise appeal rights
and go public as the antithesis of protected conduct-as extortion, like a
shakedown. 276

Mr. O'Connor made these charges at Congressman

Frank's oversight hearings, almost at the same time the Office of the Special Counsel was prosecuting Mr. Harvey for interfering with a different
employee's nearly identical conduct. The key decisions in the Berube
case and the Congressional hearings occurred between September and
November 1983-the same time the Special Counsel was prosecuting
277
Mr. Harvey.
A comparison of the Special Counsel's interpretation of first amendment law on these two cases is revealing as well. As explained earlier, at
the Congressional hearing on Mr. Berube, Mr. O'Connor hid behind a
distorted reading of the Supreme Court's Mr. Healthy decision. He explained to Congressman Frank that his hands were tied. In fact, at the
time he started to testify that he would welcome legislation on that barrier to winning retaliation challenges. 278 Meanwhile, in the Harvey prosecution, the Special Counsel was successfully challenging the Mt.
Healthy limitations and in fact won a precedent overturning Mt. Healthy
for Special Counsel disciplinary prosecutions. The D.C. Circuit later reintegrity of the Government and on the morale of Federal employees who inhabit buildings managed
by GSA." Reprinted in id.at 151.
275 Harvey proposed the termination of the employee in advance of any knowledge of the employee's threatened appeal. Harvey's assessment of the employee and the proposed termination were
endorsed in full by his supervisor. Harvey did not have the authority to fire the employee without
this confirmation of the action of the supervisor. See generally Harvey M.S.P.R Transcript, supra
note 266.
276 In testimony before Congress, Special Counsel O'Connor attacked terms proposed by Berube's attorney in settlement negotiations. When asked if he considered Mr. Berube's actions in
pursuing an internal solution to be a shakedown, Mr. O'Connor answered "Absolutely." 1983
House Oversight Hearings,supra note 68, at 92-93. In a letter to Berube's attorney, O'Connor characterized Berube's attempts to settle the matter as "egregious insubordination and the very antithesis
of protected conduct." Reprinted in id. at 158.
277 In the Harvey case, the OSC praised the complaining employee's attempts to settle the adverse
action and used the employee's attempts as the basis for eventually finding Harvey guilty of reprisal
for exercise of appeal rights. Harvey M.S.P.B. Transcript,supra note 265 at 30-32.
278 O'Connor testified that he could not issue a stay in a case, even though there was an impermissible motive shown in the adverse action, if the agency could identify some independent basis for
the action. 1983 House Oversight Hearings,supra note 68, at 98-100. See also supra nn.216-19.
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versed the Board on Factual grounds. 279 Again, there seems to be a
double standard. The double standard raises questions whether the most
recent Special Counsel's disciplinary complaints were designed to protect
the merit system, or to protect high Administration officials from embarrassing investigations.
E. Whistleblowing disclosures
The Special Counsel's final major duty is to serve as the screening
agent for whistleblowing disclosures, to refer charges supported by reasonable belief-in other words, those where reprisal would be illegal-to
the head of the agency. 280 Where the allegations are supported by a substantial likelihood of accuracy, the Special Counsel may order the agency
to investigate and prepare a detailed report on the findings. 28' The Office
of the Special Counsel then evaluates the report for completeness and
282
reasonableness.
The whistleblowing disclosure channels are particularly important
for the Reform Act's goal of promoting the code of ethics for government
service. 283 Unfortunately, the failure of this provision may be the primary reason employees continue to avoid speaking out when they witness waste, fraud, or abuse, as illustrated by the 1980 and 1983 Merit
Systems Protection Board surveys revealing that fifty-three percent and
sixty-one percent, respectively, of would-be whistleblowers who kept silent explained that they did so because they thought their dissent
284
wouldn't make any difference.

The likelihood is that would-be whistleblowers are cynical because
the Special Counsel has administered the whistleblowing channel in bad
faith. As a result, since 1981 the OSC's primary effect has been to help
agencies defend the status quo by receiving advance warning of challenges that dissenters might otherwise bring first to Congress or the
285
press.
279 Harvey v. Merit Systems Protection Board, No. 84-1650 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 7, 1986). In terms
strikingly similar to those offered by the Administrative Law Judge in Saldana, supra n.259, the D.C.
Circuit reversed: "[T]he OSC utterly failed in its burden of proof... In short, the Board's findings
on this charge amount to sheer speculation without foundation in the record." Harvey, slip. op. at
14, 18.
280 5 U.S.C. 1206(b). Compare with 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8). Supra p. 20 & note 90.
281 5 U.S.C. 1206(b)(3). The Special Counsel's regulations provide additional strength to the
referral channel, declaring that a full agency investigation "will" be ordered whenever the substantial likelihood test is met. 5 C.F.R. 1252.3(a).
282 5 U.S.C. 1206(b)(6).
283 See supra note 46. See also, Code of Ethics Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-303, 94 Stat. 855, 5
USC 7301.
284 See supra nn.125-26.

285 Supra note 164.
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The cynicism is justified by the record. The first two Special Counsels used this channel quite actively, ordering agency investigations for
around one quarter of the complaints. 28 6 The Special Counsel initiatives
had a real impact as well. For example, one referral led to wide-ranging
reforms in the nuclear power industry. 28 7 From 1983-1985, however,
Mr. O'Connor ordered only thirty full investigations out of some 453
whistleblowing disclosures. That's about ten per year, or 7.5 percent of
the whistleblowers who seek reform through the Office of the Special
Counsel.

2 88

As before, the explanation for the discrepancy is that the OSC silently rewrote this portion of the statute. For instance, Mr. O'Connor de
facto added a section to the statute by routinely sending what he called
"informal" referrals to the agencies. He made these referrals 141 times
during fiscal years 1983-1985.29 The authority to make "informal" referrals is not listed in the Reform Act. It is not based on any legal conclusions, and does not require any agency response. Since on occasion
Mr. O'Connor disassociated the Office from the whistleblowers' charges
when he referred them, the practical effect of these referrals was to tip off
290
agencies about potential scandals while discrediting the dissent.
A second technique has been to eliminate jurisdiction for former
agency employees who seek to make whistleblowing disclosures. This
new loophole removes coverage for more than one million retired federal
employees who previously had a legal right to challenge misconduct at
291
the agencies where they served.

286 Hearings Before the House Comm. on Civil Service Subcomm. on Civil Service on HR. 3751

and HR. 3752, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 35-36 (June 19-20, 1979); 1980 OSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 243, at 20-22.
287 Letter from mary Eastwood, Special Counsel, to John Ahearne, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (December 23, 1980) (transmitting whistleblowing allegations for investigation
under 5 U.S.C. 1206(b)); Licensing Speedup, Safety Delay: NRC Oversight- Report by the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1981); Peterson, Nuclear Plant has
Given Utilities Many Headaches, The New York Times, November 17, 1982 at A16, col. 1; Liebau et
al., CG&E Slapped with Record Fine, The Cincinnati Post, November 25, 1981 at 1, col. 4; Liebau,
Zimmer Case Inspires Inspection Reforms, The Cincinnati Post, November 18, 1981 at lB, col. 4;
Omang, NRC Faults Its Own Safety Probe at Ohio A-Plant, The Washington Post, November 21,
1981 at A16, col. 1.
288 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, A REPORT TO CONGRESS FROM THE OFFICE OF THE

SPECIAL COUNSEL, FISCAL YEAR 1983, 13-14 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 OSC ANNUAL REPORT]; 1984 OSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 18-19; 1985 OSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 123, at 15-16.
289 Id.

290 See, e.g., Coplin Closeout, supra note 222, where the Special Counsel rejected the charges and
determined that no referral for investigation was appropriate under the section 1206(b), yet forwarded the complete file of the charges to the Secretary of Agriculture.
291 Id. Compare the Special Counsel's interpretation with 5 U.S.C. 1206(b)(3)(B)(i), which specifies when the whistleblowing disclosure was submitted to the Special Counsel by "any employee or
former employee or applicant for employment in the agency which the information concerns."
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Third, the Special Counsel has refused to order investigations based
on hearsay evidence. 292 This is another restriction that Mr. O'Connor
added to the statute. The restriction is rarely applied to administrative
law, where hearsay evidence is commonly used in formal litigation. 293
Even more important, government investigations are frequently triggered
by hearsay evidence, and consist in part of hearsay evidence. 294
Fourth, the Special Counsel has failed to order agency investigations
on whistleblower charges that were included within reprisal allegations. 295 This oversight has happened routinely, although the Reform
Act requires the Special Counsel to refer evidence of misconduct for
agency investigation, whether or not the reprisal victim made that
request.

296

Fifth, the OSC has declined to order agency investigations when the
whistleblower was not the first to expose the problem, such as when the
agency already has had an investigation on some part of the same
charges.297 Under this approach, one coverup is good indefinitely.
Sixth, the Special Counsel does not provide whistleblowers with a
copy of the charges, even after ruling that there is a substantial likelihood
that the employee's allegations are correct and ordering an investigation
under 5 USC 1206(bO(3). As a result, the complainant whose
whistleblowing charges sparked the investigation is still a bystander, and
it is officially none of his or her business what issues the OSC referred to
the agency chief. This policy raises a question whether the OSC has
properly understood and referred for investigation an accurate statement
29 8
of the whistleblower's concerns.

292 Coplin Closeout, supra note 222, at 2.
293 See KOHN, supra note 8, at 58-59.
294 See, e.g., the Office of Personnel Management's investigation in the Mittleman case, supra
note 160, where an OSC representative offered the assessment based on hearsay evidence that a
whistleblower was not fit for renewed government employment.
295 See supra nn. 168-84. For example, in the Berube case the OSC did not refer the charges for
agency investigation under 5 U.S.C. 1206, although Mr. O'Connor testified, "[t]here is not much
question in my mind that Mr. Berube's speech was protected. Not much question at all about that.
I think it is protected." 1983 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 68, at 86.
296 See supra note 90. Under 5 U.S.C. 1206(b)(2), "whenever" the OSC receives information that
would qualify as protected whistleblowing dissent under 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8), the Special Counsel
"shall promptly transmit" it to the appropriate agency head.
297 Laubach Closeout, supra note 210; Coplin Closeout, supro, note 222.
298 This was the case with Mr. Delgado, who independently received a copy of the report only
after refusing to cooperate with subsequent USDA investigations until permitted to see the results of
the first inquiry into his charges. (See December 20, 1985 memorandum from Donald Dijulio, OSC,
to Thomas Devine, GAP, declining to provide a copy of the USDA OIG Report unless clearance
could be obtained from the Department of Agriculture). Even then, the public file only contained a
reference to the missing exhibits and investigative report that the Secretary of Agriculture's letter
purportedly summarized, without actually including the documents. OSC File No. 10-5-71030 (public log of whistleblowing reports required under 5 U.S.C. 1206(d)).
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Seventh, when the head of the agency does send back his or her
report, the Special Counsel will not share the supporting exhibits and
investigative basis for the report's conclusions with the whistleblower unless the agency consents. The same restriction applies to the information
going into the public file. The agency chief's summary is there, but not
the evidence unless the agency agrees. 299 Although agencies generally
agree to include the investigative report, this restriction can be quite significant. On occasion the agency chief's summary findings contradict the
evidence presented by the Inspector General who investigated the
whistleblower's charges. That occurred with Mr. Delgado. The USDA
Inspector General issued a report presenting evidence that confirmed Mr.
Delgado's most serious allegations and in fact expanded on them. 3°° The
Secretary of Agriculture, however, issued a summary letter to the Special
Counsel that failed to mention the decisive supporting evidence and instead denied the validity of Mr. Delgado's allegations. 30 1 Until Mr. Delgado took independent initiatives, the USDA failed to provide a copy of
the Inspector General report. By that time, however, the Special Counsel had sent letters to the President and to the Congress supporting
USDA's position that there was no validity to any of Mr. Delgado's
charges.

302

Eighth, at the end of the process the Special Counsel has asked for
the whistleblower's help in evaluating the agency report in only two or
three cases per year. 30 3 That is not reassuring, because in most instances
the alleger is an indispensable source of information for the Special
Counsel to assess whether the agency's response represents a good faith
299 Id. The recent whistleblowing disclosure of Mr. James Pope concerning alleged mismanagement of the Federal Aviation Administration's Mid-Air Collision Avoidance Program provides a
good example of the OSC's refusal to divulge support documents of an agency response. OSC denied
Mr. Pope's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the supporting documentation for the
Department of Transportation (DOT) investigation report and challenged GAP's request for a fee
waiver. (Letter from Robert D. L'Heureux, Associate Special Counsel for Investigation, to Thomas
Devine (June 23, 1986).) An identical FOIA to the DOT resulted in the release of an investigation
report that went into much greater detail than the summary included in the OSC's public file, but
DOT denied GAP's fee waiver request and withheld two documents. (FOIA response letter and
documents from Mary 0. McBride, Deputy Asst. Secretary for Public Affairs, to Thomas Devine
(July 17, 1986).) OSC again denied the request on appeal. (Letter from William E. Reukauf, Associate Special Counsel for Prosecution, to Thomas Devine (August 15, 1986).) On appeal DOT reconsidered its response, granted the fee waiver, and released the previously witheld documents. (Letter
from Rosalind A. Knapp, Deputy General Counsel DOT, to Don Aplin (August 20, 1986).)
-o0 See generally USDA OIG REPORT, supra note 230.
301 Letter from Orville Bentley, Acting Secretary of Agriculture, to K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel (November 29, 1985) [hereinafter referred to as Bentley letter].
302 Supra, note 300, letter From K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel, to President Reagan
(December 17, 1985) (enclosing Bentley letter, supra note 301).
303 Letter from K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel, to Senator Carl Levin, 2 (May 14, 1986)
[hereinafter referred to as O'Connor-Levin letter].
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investigation or a whitewash. The whistleblower can tell the Special
Counsel the soft areas to doublecheck when evaluating the report.
Not surprisingly, the Special Counsel almost always accepts
whatever report the agency sends back. 3°4 The example of Dr. Carl Telleen, another whistleblower from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, is
illustrative. In response to a Special Counsel referral, the Department of
Agriculture submitted a report on Dr. Telleen's charges that there were
dangerous levels of fecal contamination in poultry inspected and approved by the USDA. Dr. Telleen prepared a 77-page affidavit rebutting
inaccuracies and omissions in the USDA analysis, which predictably had
denied that there were any problems in the inspection service. Telleen
presented affidavits and reports of interviews from eight supporting witnesses who attacked the USDA Inspector General for refusing to take
down information in support of Dr. Telleen's charges. Dr. Telleen
presented twelve citations to scientific studies and references. By contrast, the agency's only new scientific support since 1975 was a reference
30 5
to an unpublished study prepared by USDA.
Dr. Telleen prepared all of this evidence to rebut a report which
represents a relentless personal attack upon him as an eccentric, incompetent individual, while essentially ignoring all of the scientific evidence
he had presented for his dissent and misrepresenting positions of wit30 6
nesses to make it appear that he had been isolated among his peers.
The witnesses were so distraught about it that they gave statements to
the Government Accountability Project, Dr. Telleen's counsel, that repudiated the Inspector General's position. In one case, the witness had refused to sign the statement from the agency investigator. It represented
the opposite of his point of view. The USDA, however, was undaunted.
The report included the unsigned statement and quoted it freely, to make
it appear that the witness was a critic of Dr. Telleen. After learning of
the deception, the witness later signed an affidavit in support of the whis304As the Special Counsel informed Senator Levin, "[i]nthe past three and one half years, the
Office of Special Counsel has not notified the head of an agency that a report was not deemed to be
reasonable pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 1206(b)(6). O'Connor-Levin letter, supra note 303, at 1. The OSC
routinely accepts agency reports that are prepared by Inspectors General of the agency without
further question. The OSC explained its deference this way: "[w]here agency Inspectors General
have been assigned by the agency head to investigate a Special Counsel complaint, the results are
uniformly satisfactory. The overwhelming trend is for agency heads to commit these whistleblower
investigations to their Inspectors General." 1985 OSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 15.
This deference and circular reasoning can lead to a lack of rigor in the OSC's evaluation of agency

reports.
305Compare generally letter from John Norton, Acting Secretary of Agriculture, to K. William
O'Connor, Special Counsel (June 20, 1985) [hereinafter referred to as Norton letter] and referenced
exhibits, with Letter from Thomas Devine to K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel (February 3,
1986) [hereinafter referred to as Telleen rebuttal] and referenced exhibits.
306Norton letter, supra note 306, at 2-6.
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leblowing charges. 30 7 When Dr. Telleen presented all of this information
to the OSC, the Special Counsel, without any explanation or comment,
stated that the agency report was reasonable and complete and repre308
sented a final resolution of the issues.
V.

EFFECT OF THE REFORM ACT ON CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

As discussed above, one of the reasons for passage of the Civil Service Reform Act was congressional dissatisfaction with judicial development of newly established first amendment rights for public
employees. 30 9 Unfortunately, the impact of the Act's failure to protect
whistleblowers has not been limited to relief available under the statute.
As will be discussed below, an unintended side effect of the legislation is
the judicial interpretation that the Act largely precludes the constitutional remedies that were available to federal employees before its passage. This effect, in combination with continued erosion of first
amendment rights and stricter burdens of proof for constitutional tort
actions, means in all likelihood that actual and potential federal employee whistleblowers are more vulnerable to reprisal than before the Reform Act.
A. First amendment trends
The federal courts do not consider the balancing factors of Pickering
to be exclusive, and have added new factors since the Reform Act's passage. Some of these criteria have worked against the whistleblower asserting a first amendment claim. The balance may tip in favor of the
employer in cases involving decisions already made through proper channels;3 10 the speech of employees with broad discretionary power; 31'
speech directed to an external party; 31 2 the speech of supervisory or long
307 Compare Affidavit of Norman V. Lawrence (September 5, 1985) with contradictory Unsigned
Statement of Norman V. Lawrence (May 13, 1985), enclosed as Exhibit B-12 to Norton Letter, supra

note 305.
308 Letter from Robert L'Heureux, Office of the Special Counsel, to Dr. Carl Telleen, OSC Case
No. 10-5-71030 (November 26, 1985). Dr. Telleen had presented the rebuttal evidence informally to
the OSC. He presented the formal analysis in his rebuttal, supra note 305, in a February 3, 1986
request for reconsideration. As of October 1986 the Special Counsel had not responded.

309 See supra nn.32, 62.
310 Roberts v. Van Buren Public Schools, 773 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985), (the concerns underlying
the Pickering, supra note 26, balance suggest that a government as an employer has a legitimate
interest in achieving compliance with decisions that, while once open to dispute and discussion, have
been made through proper channels).
311 Gonzales v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985), (senior government employees who
exercise broad discretionary authority may be able to make or break the programs and policies of
elected officials).
312 Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1985), (inquiry into whether
the authorities appealed to are the appropriate recipients for such communication. Also employee
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term employees; 31 3 and where there is a legitimate need for personal loyalty to a system rather than an individual, 314 as with military and law
enforcement employees who may also be held to a higher standard of
employee loyalty. 3 15 Under Pickering these factors are important to
show that the adverse action was justified in light of disruption caused by
the employee's speech.
In the case of a true whistleblower, the balance is weighted in favor
of the employee because a certain amount of disruption is a small price to
pay for the public's interest in exposing government corruption. 316 As
the Fifth Circuit explained in a pre-Reform Act case, Porter v.
Califano, 3 17 the first amendment does not authorize corrupt officials to
punish subordinates who reveal the misconduct simply because the employee's speech somewhat disrupts the office. 3 18 Porteris solace only for
an employee whose dissent has been clearly vindicated, however, and the
decision has not had a significant impact on the steady erosion of Pickering's potential scope.3 19
By contrast, the most significant issue since the Act has become the
employee's motive for dissent, such as potential self-interest from the
speech. In effect, despite its public benefit, otherwise protected speech
may be deprived of first amendment coverage because the speaker intended to further private goals, or at least had a dual purpose. 320 The de
complained to outside authorities on the same day she contacted internal authorities about the
problems, thereby eliminating any chance for response by the internal authorities).
313 Brown, supra note 113 (During air traffic controllers strike Brown, a supervisor with long
experience, spoke sympathetically about the strike on television and to union members. The court
emphasized Brown's position as a supervisor and as an employee to whom other controllers could be
expected to look to for guidance. The court also emphasized the seriousness of the situation. "Cooperation, loyalty, and trust are particularly important among those managing the operation of a
complex, sophisticated transportation system, where the lives of hundreds of innocent members of
the public may, in an extreme case, depend upon split-second judgement.") Id. at 547.
314 Germann v. City of Kansas City, 776 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1985). (Although Fire Captain and
Chief did not have a close working relationship, personal loyalty was critical to the "management
structure.")
315 Chappel v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), (military); Hughes v. Whitney, 714 F.2d 1407, 1419
(8th Cir. 1983), cert. den., 465 U.S. 1023 (1984), (police).
316 See Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Brockell v. Norton, 688 F.2d 588,
593 (8th Cir. 1982).
317 592 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1979).
318 Id. at 773-74. ("An employee who accurately exposes rampant corruption in her office no
doubt may disrupt and demoralize much of the office, but it would be absurd to hold that the first
amendment generally authorizes corrupt officials to punish subordinates who blow the whistle simply because the speech somewhat disrupted the office.") See also Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d
1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 1979); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2nd Cir.
1979).
319 No reported decisions have relied on Porter to provide extra weight to a whistleblower's
speech.
320 See Alinovi v. Worcester School Committee, 766 F.2d 660 (1st Cir. 1985). (Teacher's
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facto "selfless motive" element means that to receive constitutional protection, the dissenter must prevail on difficult factual issues of motive
twice, both with respect to the bad faith of the government and the
whistleblower's own purity of intent.
This policy blossomed in 1983, when the Supreme Court announced
its decision in Connick v. Myers. 32 1 The Connick decision significantly
changed the Pickering scenario in two ways. First, the Pickering balancing factor of whether the speech is on an issue of public concern was
elevated to a threshold position. In order to be protected, speech must be
on a matter of "legitimate public concern. 322 If a court determines that
the "employee spoke not as a citizen but as an employee expressing a
personal grievance about internal office policy," the speech is
unprotected. 323
In determining whether comments are on matters of legitimate public concern, the court looked at the "content, form, and context of the
statement as revealed by the entire record. ' 324 This analysis allows a
court to review the context of the speech initially to determine the
threshold question, and a second time for the Pickering balance. As the
dissenters, led by Justice Brennan, were quick to point out, the Connick
325
decision significantly narrowed that speech which will be protected.
threatened discipline for not handing over her thesis containing generally negative comments about
the school's handling of special programs for one child motivated her to post discipline letters on
parents night. Even though the root of the speech concerned school policy, the court said the primary purpose of the speech was to resolve a discipline problem, not to inform parents.); Foster,supra
note 316. (Discharged V.P. at Cancer Research Project of the Smithsonian's Science Information
Exchange protested reorganization of project and communicated displeasure to national Cancer Institute official who helped fund the project. Although Foster complained that the reorganization
would decrease the efficiency of the project, thus providing a lessened public benefit, the court found
that Foster was acting out of personal motivation because the reorganization would transfer two of
the branches he then controlled to other officials.)
321 461 U.S. 138 (1983). (Myers, an assistant district attorney, circulated a questionnaire to fellow district attorneys asking their opinions on office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a
grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to
work in political campaigns.)
322 Id. at 147. (Only Myers' campaign question was found to be a matter of legitimate public
concern by the majority.)
323 Id. at 147-48. Although the statutory language and underlying legislative intent of 5 U.S.C.
2302(b)(8) intentionally are broader than first amendment protection, supra nn. 63-64, in Fiorello v.
Department of Justice, 795 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the Federal Circuit reasoned that the first
amendment and the whistleblower statute provide identical coverage. Id, slip op. at 11,14. The
court then applied the Connick selfless motive standard to disqualify dissenters under the Reform
Act: "[t]o be given 'whistleblower' status and thus the protections under 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8), the
primary motivation of the employee must be the desire to imform the public on matters of public
concern, and not personal vindictiveness." Id., slip op. at 16 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original).
324 Id.

325 Id. at 156-70 (Brennan dissenting), (the operation of the district attorney's office is certainly a
matter of public concern; who better to inform the voters than an employee directly involved?).
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The second significant change made by Connick rebalances the Pickering scales. The disruption necessary to justify suppression of the
speech was greatly reduced. The Court stated that it is not necessary
"for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the Office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest
before taking action. '3 26 In this circumstance, Connick appears to allow
a prior restraint of speech. Even before speech becomes disruptive, it
may be suppressed through constitutionally permissible threats of
dismissal.
While Connick presents some difficult obstacles for the aggrieved
federal whistleblower, the Court did state firmly that the state's burden
in justifying a particular adverse action varies depending on the nature of
the employee's expression. 327 This leaves the door open for a sliding
scale-to hold the employer to a higher standard depending on the public benefit of the dissent. Although Connick is analytically consistent
with Pickering, the uncertain prospect of successfully jumping through
an increasing number of constitutional hoops confirms the legislative wisdom of reinforcing existing first amendment protections for dissent.
B. Loss of jurisdiction
Despite discouragement with recent trends in case law,
whistleblowers can ill afford to lose access to the Constitution. But parallel developments in case law interpreting the CSRA's effect on the ability of federal whistleblowers to bring actions against individuals for
violation of their constitutional rights have all but foreclosed the ability
to seek relief through constitutional torts.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau of NarCotiCS, 3 2 8 the Supreme Court held that violation of the fourth amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and seizures by a federal
agent, acting under his federal authority, gave rise to a cause of action
against the agent for damages. 329 The Court based its decision on the
historical precedent that "damages have long been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty. '330
Subsequently the federal courts extended the Bivens holding to find
an implied right of action from the Constitution in cases involving the
first, 33' fifth, 33 2 sixth, 333 and eighth 334 amendments. The Supreme Court
326 Id. at 152.
327 Id. at 150.
328 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
329 Id. at 389.
330 Id. at 395; see Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
331 Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting Co., 424 F. Supp. 1325 (Conn. 1976), revd. on
other grounds, 566 F.2d 384 (2nd Cir. 1976); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3rd Cir. 1975); White
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further extended it by finding an implied cause of action under the fifth
3 35
amendment in Davis v. Passman.
While supporting an implied cause of action under the eighth
amendment in Carlson v. Green,336 the Court defined the standard for
accepting Bivens actions. There is a presumption that persons affected by
a federal agent's constitutional violation have a cause of action against
the agent for damages.3 37 However, the Court listed two situations in
which a Bivens action could be precluded: 1) the presence of "special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress,"' 338 and 2) the showing that Congress has "provided an alternative
remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective. ' 339 Unfortunately the Court did not provide much guidance as to when the two
situations are to be found, or to what the term "special factors counsel34 °
ling hesitation" means.
Prior to the decisions, several federal courts had concluded that the
existence of an effective and substantial federal statutory remedies for
plaintiffs obviates the need to create a constitutional cause of action and
remedy using a Bivens approach. 341 However, the Court in Carlson made
v. Boyle, 538 F.2d 1077 (4th Cir. 1976); Liberman v. Schesventer, 447 F. Supp. 1355; Yiamanyiannis
v. Chemical Abstracts Service, 521 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1975), later app., 578 F.2d 164, cert. den., 439
U.S. 983; Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist., 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. den., 411 U.S.
967; Sheets v. Stanley Community School Dist., 413 F. Supp. 350 (N.D. 1975), affd., 532 F.2d 111
(8th Cir. 1975); Butler v. U.S., 365 F. Supp. 1035 (Hawaii 1973); Dellums v. Powell, 184 App. D.C.
275, 566 F.2d 167 (1977), cert. den. 438 U.S. 916, rev. den., 439 U.S. 886.
332Regan v. Sullivan, 417 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. N.Y. 1976), affd. in part and revd. in parton other
grounds, 557 F.2d 300 (2nd Cir. 1976); U.S. ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 467 F.2d 892 (3rd Cir. 1972);
States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974); Liberman, supra note 331; Hill
v. McMartin, 432 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Meiners v. Moriarty, 563 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1977);
Coomer v. Adkinson, 414 F. Supp. 976 (S.C. 1976); Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
566 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977), affd. in part and revd. in part on other grounds, 440 U.S. 391;
Thornwell v. U.S., 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.C. 1979).
333 Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.C. 1976).
334 Hernandez v. Lattimore, 612 F.2d 61 (2nd Cir. 1979); Botway v. Carlson, 474 F. Supp. 836
(E.D. Va. 1979); Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1978); Cline v. Herman, 601 F.2d 374
(8th Cir. 1979).
335 442 U.S. 228 (1979), (discharged Congressional employee alleging sex discrimination had
right of action arising under the due process clause. No other adequate remedy available).
336446 U.S. 14 (1980), (estate of deceased inmate alleging failure by prison officials to give him
proper medical attention had right of action under the Eighth Amendment).
337 Id.
338 Id. (quoting Bivens, supra note 328 at 396).
339 Id. at 18-19.
340 The Court in Bivens, supra note 328 at 396, attempted to illustrate the concept of "special
factors" by referring to U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), and to U.S. v. Gilman, 347
U.S. 507 (1954). (These two cases involved questions of employee discipline and morale, fiscal policy, and the efficiency of the federal service.)
341 Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (R.I. 1978), affd., 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir.
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it clear that the substitute must be "equally effective. ' 342 The question
for federal employees then became whether the CSRA preempts their
right to sue in court for constitutional violations in a Bivens-type action.
In the first case at the appellate level involving this question, Borrell v.
U.S. InternationalCommunicationsAgency, 343 the D.C. Circuit Court rejected the Government's claim that "the CSRA preempts all alternative
remedies for all employees, even those preexisting judicial remedies based
upon the Constitution which have not been replaced by administrative
appeals or judicial review of any kind."' 344 The Court concluded "that
Congress intended CSRA to provide additional, not decreased, protection for federal employees who blow the whistle on illegal or improper
'34 5
government conduct.
The decision preserved the possibility that employees who had no
remedy within the CSRA for redress of a constitutional violation could
bring suit in district court. They may represent the only class of public
employees left with that right. In 1983, the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Bush v. Lucas.3 46 While assuming that a federal right was
violated and that Congress had provided a less than complete remedy for
the wrong, 347 the Court went on to dismiss the claim as preempted by the
CSRA. Avoiding the obvious inadequacy and equal effectiveness questions of the CSRA as an alternative remedy, the Court rejected jurisdiction by finding that the CSRA itself was a "special factor counselling
1978), (Thirteenth Amend. claim-state causes of action remedy); Torres v. Taylor, 456 F. Supp.
951 (S.E. N.Y. 1978), (Fifth and Eighth Amend. claims-FTCA remedy); People ex rel. Snead v.
Kirkland, 462 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Pa. 1978), (Fifth Amend. claim-FTCA remedy); McKenzie v.
Calloway, 456 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Mich. 1978), affd., 625 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1978), (Fifth Amend.
claim-APA remedy); Treho v. U.S., 464 F. Supp. 113 (NEV 1978), (Fourth Amend. claim-FTCA
remedy); Beeman v. Middendorf, 425 F. Supp. 713 (D.C. 1977), (Fifth Amend. claim-Title VII
CRA remedy); Neely v. Blumenthal, 458 F. Supp. 945 (D.C. 1978), (First Amend. claim-Title VII
CRA remedy); Nagy v. U.S., 471 F. Supp. 383 (D.C. 1979), (First, Fourth, and Fifth Amend.
claims-FTCA remedy).
342 Supra note 336 at 18-19. (The Court in Carlson stated that the issue is not whether a Bivens,
supra note 328, action is essential, but whether Congress has set in place what it views as an equally
effective remedial scheme. No one difference need render such alternatives inadequate; they can fail
to be equally effective based on a comparison of cumulative differences. Although plaintiffs could
have brought suit under FTCA, the allegations could also support an Eighth Amendment claim.)
343 Supra note 95.
344 Id. at 989-991. (The government relied on Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976) which held
that Title VII of CRA at 1964 was the exclusive source of judicial remedies for discrimination arising out of federal employment.)
345 Id. at 990.
346 462 U.S. 367 (1983), (Bush involved a suit by a NASA engineer for defamation and violation
of first amendment rights after he was demoted for making public statements highly critical of the
agency).
341 Id. at 373, (Bush was improperly disciplined by his supervisor for exercising his First Amendment rights).
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hesitation. ' 348 The Court characterized the ultimate question of the case
to be "one of 'federal personnel policy.' -349 In a review of the historical
development of federal employee rights and remedies, the Court found a
congressional intent "that these remedies would put the employee 'in the
same position he would have been in had the unjustified or erroneous
personnel action not taken place.' "350 This meant that damages for constitutional violations were inappropriate, and a Bivens remedy was
outside the intent of Congress.
The Court stated that it was deferring to Congress by holding that
the "elaborate remedial system" established by the CSRA was sufficient
to effectively redress employee first amendment claims, and that there
was no reason for the Court to augment the system by the creation of a
new judicial remedy. 3 5I The Court maneuvered around the inquiry into
the effectiveness of the alternative remedies of the CSRA by characterizing the issue as predominantly legislative. "We are convinced that Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest
''
would be served by creating it. 352

Ironically, several primary sponsors of the CSRA submitted an amicus curiae brief in the Bush case to emphasize the legislative intent of
Congress:
The express reliance by the Court below, in denying a Bivens remedy, on the availability of alternative civil service remedies was in
error because the Court below failed to make the findings, required
by Carlson, that Congress intended these civil service remedies to
be exclusive and viewed these remedies as equally effective. Into the contrary, and supports
deed, congressional intent is clearly 353
the implication of a Bivens remedy.
341Id. (The Court relies on the special factors illustrations presented in Bivens, supra note 328 at
396.) See note 14.
349Id. at 380-81. (By thus characterizing petitioner's first amendment claim as a federal personnel matter, the Court was able to analogize the instant case to the illustrations provided in Bivens,
supra note 328, of special factors.)
350 Id. at 391 (Marshall and Blackmun concurring), (quoting S. Rep. No. 1062, 89th Cong. 2d
Sess. 1 (1966), USCCAN 1966, at 2097), (the court reasoned that the damages element of a Bivens,
supra note 328, remedy does not effectuate the Congressional intent of the CSRA).
351Id. at 388. ("The question is not what remedy the court should provide for a wrong that
would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue. That
question obviously cannot be answered simply by noting that existing remedies do not provide complete relief for the Plaintiff.")
352 Id. at 390.
353 Brief amicus curiae of Representatives Schroeder, Fascell, Udall, Chisolm, Vento, Albosta,
Ferraro, Lowry, Petri, and Senator Proxmire, Members of Congress, and the National Taxpayers
Union, in support of Petitioner, at 2.

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:5

The federal courts have generally applied the Bush holding
strictly, 354 and the inquiry into when a Bivens-type suit will stand has

been severely limited by the Supreme Court precedent. 35 5 As a result,
the CSRA has not strengthened whistleblower protection. After Bush
and its progeny, the Act's effect has been to eliminate entirely a preexisting right to sue individuals for constitutional violations in damages actions and left the whistleblower to seek redress within the inadequate and
sometimes counterproductive scheme of the CSRA. Ironically, now that
the legal dust has settled for public employees, the comparative winners
may be those with constitutional claims but without access to the dubious benefits of the Civil Service Reform Act's comprehensive remedial
356
scheme.
However, at least one federal circuit has made a point of refocusing
the inquiry into the meaningfulness and constitutional adequacy of the
CSRA's remedies as an alternative to Bivens-type relief. In Doe v. US.
Department of Justice,357 the District of Columbia Circuit stated that
"Bush held only that where civil servants enjoy meaningful and constitutionally adequate statutory remedies for first amendment violations, federal courts should not imply additional Bivens-type damages remedy
under the Constitution. ' 358 The D.C. Circuit has recognized Bivens
claims of government employees after the Bush decision for first 359 and

fifth 360 amendment claims.
354See Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1984) (first amendment) (the fact that administrative
remedies available here were less exhaustive that those in Bush, supra note 346, does not render Bush
inapposito); Philippus v. Griffen, 754 F.2d 806 (10th Cir. 1985) (first amendment) (it is the jobrelated comprehensiveness of the scheme-not the details of its remedies-that is important in
Bush); Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (first amendment) (pre-CSRA system is
comprehensive enough to pass Bush standard); Gremillian v. Chivatero, 749 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.
1985) (first and fifth amendments) (Attempt to distinguish claim from Bush on bad faith grounds
rejected. It is not the inadequacy of the statutory remedy, but deference to Congressional policy
which controls); Clemente v. U.S., 766 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1985) (fifth amendment) (comprehensive
system of CSRA exclusive); Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (withdrawing
judicial review of personnel actions previously available under the Administrative Procedure Act for
non-constitutional claims, due to passage of the CSRA); Premachandra v. U.S., 574 F. Supp. 365
(E.D. Mo.1983) (FTCA actions foreclosed by CSRA); Veit v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1984);
Braun, supra note 106; Carter v. Kurzejeski, 706 F.2d 835 (8th Cir. 1983); Schrachta v. Curtis, 752
F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1985); Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982); Poorsina, supra note
106; Hallock, supra note 106.
355 See, e.g., Hallock, Id. (Bush, supra note 346, is absolute precedent).
356 See, e.g., Windsor v. The Tennesean, 726 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1984) (Assistant U.S. Attorney
could maintain constitutional claim only because he was not a civil service employee).
357 753 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
358 Id. at 1109.
359Reuber v. U.S., 750 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Morris v. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority, 702 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
360Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1984), (District court must entertain constitutional
claim of federal employee where statutory scheme provides no remedy.).
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In Andrade v. Lauer,36 1 the D.C. Circuit established that the CSRA
does not establish an exclusive jurisdictional scheme. Rather, the Court
viewed the Act as a set of administrative remedies which need to be exhausted before filing suit.362 Andrade was supported by a long line of
cases in the D.C. Circuit which, although speaking in terms of exclusivity
rather than exhaustion, held that a district court must entertain the constitutional claims of federal employees, especially in the case where the
employee is limited in his choice of remedies under the CSRA and enjoys
no appeal rights to the MSPB. 363 As the Court found in Andrade, ex-

haustion makes little sense in constitutional claims such as claims under
the Appointments clause, where the decisionmakers in the CSRA's
scheme have neither the qualifications nor the expertise to articulate and
364
develop those principles.
The D.C. Circuit also has recognized the availability of equitable
relief from the federal courts, despite the Bush holding that the CSRA
provides an exclusive scheme of remedies. The Doe court explained,
"[t]he Bush holding in no way affects the scope of constitutional rights,
and nothing in Bush or any other court opinion casts doubt on the presumed availability of federal equitable relief against federal officials for
committing constitutional violations. '36 5 The Sixth Circuit echoed this
finding in Gilley v. US. 366 "Though the Reform Act of 1978 represented
a comprehensive overhaul of the federal civil service system, we find no
indication within the statutory language, or the legislative history, of an
' 367
intent to deprive district courts of their traditional equitable powers.
The Gilley court relied on the holding in Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner,368 which stated that "[i]n the absence of a clear showing of congressional intent to do so, courts will not infer that the enactment of a
particular statute containing provisions for judicial review has the effect
3 69
of withdrawing from the courts their traditional equitable powers.
361 729 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
362 Id. at 1484-90.
363 Carducci, supra note 354 (reassigned federal employee, unable to appeal to MSPB, could bring
fifth amendment action in federal district court); Cutts, supra note 106 at 140 (transferred federal
employee, unable to appeal to MSPB, could bring fifth amendment action in federal district court);
Borrell,supra note 95 at 990 (probationary federal employee, with a remedy before the Special Counsel but unable to appeal to MSPB, could bring a first amendment action in federal district court);
Kennedy v. U.S., 5 Cl. Ct. 792 (1984), (where federal employee claims unconstitutional deprivation
of statutorily created substantive right, and where no other review is available, claims court would
not abandon jurisdiction).
364Andrade, supra note 361 at 1490-91.
365 Doe, supra note 357 at 1109.
366 649 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 453.
368 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
369 Id. at 141.
367
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The Gilley court went on to say that although traditionally a reviewing
court orders a stay in order to maintain the status quo pending its own
review, 370 the jurisdictional grant of federal question cases 37 1 to the district courts was enough to maintain the traditional equity role. 37 2 The

court went on to dismiss the exhaustion rationale as well, reasoning that
since the OSC's power to issue stays was discretionary, there was no need
to exhaust before filing suit. 373 In the case of an injunction, exhaustion
must give way in the face of irreparable harm. 374 Unfortunately, how-

ever, from the perspective of whistleblowers Gilley remains an anomaly
even within the Sixth Circuit, and its viability is questionable following
375
subsequent Sixth Circuit decisions.
The D.C. Circuit has found other areas in which the CSRA's
scheme does not preempt judicial review. In Flake v. Bennett,376 the

D.C. District Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider constitu377
tional challenges to a regulatory program with broad application.
C. Immunity of government officials from liabilityfor
constitutional violations
The battle to overcome the preemption and exhaustion challenges of
the government is becoming less worth the fight, in light of the current
status of immunity for government officials from liability for constitutional violations.
Government officials have long attempted to claim an absolute im378
munity from violation of constitutional rights. In nixon v. Fitzgerald,
the supreme Court held that the President is entitled to such an absolute
privilege. 379 However, the Court stated that the privilege extends "only
to acts in performance of particular functions of his office." 380 The Court
relief on the historical precedent that the privilege extends to all matters
38t
committed by law to official control or supervision of the President.
Even if the action is outside the normal activities of the President, if it is
370 F.R. App. 8; Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers
Assoc. v. Federal Power Commission, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
371 28 U.S.C. 1331.
372 Gilley, supra note 366 at 453.
373Id.
374

Id.

375See Braun, supra note 106 (no implied private right of action in the CSRA).
376 611 F. Supp. 70 (D.C. 1985).
377 Id. at 76; (new security review requirement for government trial attorneys).
378Supra note 31.
379Id. at 750-54.

380Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978).
381Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
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within the outer perimeter of his duty the privilege will apply.38 2 In similar holdings the Court has found the absolute immunity privilege to apply to legislators in their legislative functions, 383 judges in their judicial
functions, 38

4

385
and prosecutors in their prosecutorial functions.

In the companion case to Nixon of Harlow v. Fitzgerald,38 6 the
Court held that no absolute immunity exists for the senior aides and advisors to the President. 387 For executive officials in general, qualified
immunity is the norm: 388 "[f]ederal officials who seek absolute exemp-

tion from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must bear the
burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that
scope.

' 389

officials

The Court reinforced that damages actions against high

are

guarantees.

'390

"an important

means of vindicating

constitutional

The Court cited a "special functions" justification for invoking immunity to further the public interest. First, the official must show that he
was involved in a function so sensitive as to require a total shield from
liability. Second, the official must show that he was discharging the pro39 1
tected function when performing the act for which liability is asserted.
Nonetheless, the high-minded statement of policy was cut down by
the holding of the Court. The major discussion in Harlow centered on
the doctrine of good faith immunity as it then existed. Good faith immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the defendant government official. 392 Before Harlow the defense had both an objective and
a subjective aspect. The objective aspect concerned the presumptive
knowledge of and respect for "basic unquestioned constitutional
rights. ' 39 3 The subjective aspect dealt with the permissible intentions of
382 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 464, 575 (1959).
383 Eastland v. U.S. Serviceman's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). See Gravel v. U.S., 408 U.S. 606,
621-22 (1972), (speech and debate clause applicable to the legislative acts of a Senator's aide).
384 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 341-43 (1978), (Three areas of inquiry: 1) whether the act

is pursuant to a case or controversy, 2) the nature of the act itself, 3) the expectations of the parties.);
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980), (Judiciary may occupy
dual roles that encompass nonjudicial action.); Pulliam v. Allen, 464 U.S. 473, n.6 (1984), (Judicial
immunity is no bar to injunctive relief. Although the judiciary is immune from paying monetary
civil damages for unconstitutional practices, they are not immune from federal court injunction and
award of attorney's fees related thereto.)
385 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
386 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
387 Id. at 809.
388 Id. at 808. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985), (U.S. Atty. General

does not have absolute immunity).
389 Id.

at 808.

390Id. at 808 (quoting Butz, supra note 380 at 506).
39'Id. at 809 (quoting Butz, supra note 380 at 506).
392 Id.
393Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
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the official. The defense could be defeated if the "official knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within the sphere of
official responsibility would violate constitutional rights of the plaintiff,
or if he took action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
394
constitutional rights, or injury.
Harlow eliminated the subjective aspect of the test and held that
"[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. ' 395 In Davis v. Scherer,396 the
Court emphasized that Harlow applied to discretionary, and not ministerial, duties exclusively, 397 and that the rights must be clearly
established.

398

The Supreme Court provided no guidance as to how the lower
courts were to determine whether a right is clearly established. The
lower courts have been given the difficult task of creating a formula for
identifying what constitutes a clearly established constitutional right. 399
The difficulties inherent in establishing a formula are enormous and
have led to a disparate and confusing array of decisions in the lower
courts. There are two basic vagaries left for the lower courts to resolve.
First, how well established must the right be? Second, how close must the
facts of the instant case be to apply that precedent which establishes the
right?
The first question itself embodies several other problems to resolve.
What is the court to do in the absence of binding precedent? 4°° What if
there are relatively few cases on point anywhere? 4° 1 How broadly or narrowly defined must the right be to be well established? 4° 2 What if the
394 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).

395 Supra note 386 at 818.
396 468 U.S. 183 (1984), reh. den., -

U.S. -,

105 S. Ct. 26 (1984).

397Id. at 196 n.13.
398 Id. at 194 n.12.
399 See Zweiban v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162, 168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. den. - U.S. -, 105 S.
Ct. 244 (1984), (clearly established law is difficult to define).
4m See Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1985), (in the absence of binding precedent, a court should look to whatever decisional law is available to ascertain whether the law is
clearly established, under the Harlow, supra note 386, test); Wallace v. Kind, 626 F.2d 1157, 1161

(4th Cir. 1980), cert. den., 451 U.S. 969 (1981), (immunity allowed where the law has not been
authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court, the appropriate court of appeals, and the highest
stated court).
41 Capoeman, supra note 400 at 1515 (Court must make a determination of the likelihood that
the Supreme Court or this circuit would have reached the same result as courts which had previously
considered the issue).
402 Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984), (the right must be "reasonably" well
defined).
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right is just evolving? 40 3 What is the court to do when faced with "two
conflicting opinions from different district courts, or even a split decision
in the court of appeals concerning a right?" 4 4 The Supreme Court has
declined to give guidance to the lower courts on these questions. However, the Court did rule that the mere presence of a statute or regulation
proscribing the conduct of the official does not clearly establish a constitutional right40 5
The second ambiguity, of how strictly to apply precedents, presents
another major problem of interpretation. Some courts require a relatively strict factual correspondence. 40 6 Others have adopted a more flexible approach, only requiring the plaintiff to relate established law to
analogous factual settings. 4°7 As the Ninth Circuit noted in Capoeman v.
Reed,40 requiring a close factual analogy gives license to officials to violate constitutional rights. 40 9 The Ninth Circuit declined to follow the
strict analogy rule in light of the already lower standard in Harlow for
410
finding good faith immunity.
Even though there have been federal court cases since Harlow to
find both a qualified good faith immunity present, 4 11 and to find the immunity lacking, 41 2 elimination of the subjective aspect of the defense by
403 Lojuk v. Johnson, 770 F.2d 619, 628 (7th Cir. 1985), (a reasonable government official cannot
necessarily be expected to recognize the significance of a few scattered cases from disparate areas of
the law for a right that is just evolving).
404 People of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 747 F.2d 139, 144 (3rd Cir.
1984).
405 Davis, supra note 396, (holding officials liable "for violation of any constitutional right--one

that was not clearly defined or perhaps not even foreshadowed at the time of the alleged violationmerely because their official conduct also violated some statute or regulation" violates the policy and
rule established in Harlow), id. at 195.
46 National Black Police Association v. Velde, 712 F.2d 569, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. den., U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2180 (1984), (Although Title VII provisions provided for suspension of funding
to discriminatory agencies, such a mechanism was not mandated as exclusive. Therefore no clearly
established right was found.); Saldana v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. den., 460
U.S. 1012 (1983), (The mere fact that a person is wrongfully arrested and charged with an offense
whose elements are well settled does not mean that the arrest itself contravenes well-settled law.).
407 Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1381-82 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert. den., - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct.
335 (1983).
408 754 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1985).

409 Id. at 1514.
410 Id.
411 Sprecher v. Von Stein, 772 F.2d 16 (2nd Cir. 1985), (Securities and Exchange Commission
members and officials); Hall v. U.S., 704 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. den., - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct.
508 (1983), (IRS officials); McLaughlin v. Alban, 775 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1985), (County investigator); Flinn v. Gordon, 775 F.2d 1551 (1 th Cir. 1985), (Chair of state house administrative committee
as employment matters); Wilson v. Schillinger, 761 F.2d 921 (3rd Cir. 1985), (prison officials); Egger
v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983), (FBI supervisor).
412 Olson v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1985), (police officer); Graham v. Baughman, 772 F.2d
441 (8th Cir. 1985), (prison officials); Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1985), (prison
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substituting the reasonable person test has substantially lowered the standard for finding the defense present.
Since the good faith immunity defense is a threshold matter 4 1 3 that
takes place even before discovery, many claims can be effectively cut off
before trial on motions for summary judgement. Government officials
are no longer held to the standard os presumptive knowledge of constitutional rights. The higher standard of care for respecting constitutional
rights which should be commensurate with a government official's position is largely neutralized by Harlow. As a result, it represents yet another barrier federal whistleblowers must overcome in this instance.
They may find themselves without relief before the court even considers
the merits of their constitutional claims.
VI. CONCLUSION

While Congress provided overwhelmingly rhetorical support in the
Reform Act for whistleblower rights, the message was not loud enough
for those with responsibility to implement the statute. At least with respect to the Office of the Special Counsel, an overwhelming legislative
consensus has been thwarted-indeed reversed-through bureaucratic
abuse of discretionary authority. The congressional goal of eliminating
constitutional uncertainty for federal whistleblowers has been achieved
only at the expense of a counterproductive result. Nearly all public dissenters in the federal government have been freed from the uncertainty of
Pickering, where they would have an underdog's fighting chance. Instead, whistleblowers have the certainty of institutions such as the Office
of the Special Counsel, where they have no realistic chance. The insights
of Pentagon whistleblower Ernest Fitzgerald at 1985 oversight hearings
on the OSC illustrate the Act's lack of legitimacy with its intended beneficiaries. Mr. Fitzgerald noted that loss of the right to sue in tort for
constitutional violations places civil servants behind "convicted felons"
with respect to constitutional rights. He analogized CSRA administrative remedies that deprive the victims of access to the courts to those
41
available for slaves before the Civil War.

Mr. Fitzgerald's analogy to the slavery laws is well taken in another
respect as well. The bigotry underlying repression against those whose
views are different is as ingrained as that underlying repression against
those whose color is different. But for public employees the real battle
for freedom of speech is less than twenty years old. For whistleblowers
officials); Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1985), (IRS official); Lowe v. City of Monrovia,
775 F2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985), (policeofficers).
413 Harlow, supra note 386.
414 1985 Hearings, supra note 2, at 266-67 (testimony of Ernest Fitzgerald).
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71

to match the civil rights advances of minorities and religious organizations will take a similar persistence and determination. 415
It will also take a system of legal rights that does not respond to
legislative initiatives to provide stronger rights by subtracting the Constitution from a whistleblower's remedies. It will require a system where
the victims whose rights have been violated can control their own cases.
To achieve the legislative intent of the Act, whistleblowers need more
than a bureaucratic champion who has the discretion to assist but faces
no accountability for not assisting--or even for attacking-the victims
who seek help. Since 1981 the Office of Special Counsel has proved that
lesson beyond a reasonable doubt, and freedom of speech within the civil
service remains the freedom to whisper. 416
415 See supra pp. 8-9 & nn.21, 24.
416 See supra note 141.

